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 Introduction 
 As the United States has grown from a regional power to a global hegemon, it has 
undergone consistent foreign policy evolution. Nowhere is this more prevalent than Latin 
America. The U.S. sought first to rid the New World of European influence with the 
Monroe Doctrine. As U.S. might grew in North America, the nation sought to expand 
economically. The earliest expansion occurred in Central America, where the U.S. 
worked to secure a transisthmian route and battled against the British Presence. 
 Following the Central American conflict, the U.S. clashed with the most powerful 
South American country, Chile. The U.S. would manipulate a minor encounter into a 
diplomatic crisis in order to assert its dominance over Chile with the threat of war. These 
aggressive tactics would reign supreme in U.S. diplomatic relations, as the isolationism 
ideals espoused by earlier American leaders done away with.  
 The U.S. would then look to its southern border, the Caribbean for its next bout of 
expansion. Aggressive economic and political penetration would render Cuba directly 
intertwined in the U.S. economy. The U.S. would eventually go to war with Spain, once a 
major world power, to finalize the European exit from the Caribbean, and create an 
“American Mediterranean” in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 The 20th century would see the dialing back of direct American intervention. The 
U.S. would institute new policies of non-intervention, realizing that constant intercession 
was turning the American countries against them. Though the U.S. would never erase the 
harm that it had caused to Latin America, it worked to create a sense of unity western 
hemisphere in the face of growing European powers.  
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  The most recent change comes in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center in September 2001. Prior to this, the U.S. had focused its efforts in Latin 
America on counter-narcotics programs. The U.S. forms of aid would radically shift 
towards a counter terrorist objective. As the largest change in U.S. foreign policy in 
recent decades, it begs the question whether the shift is purely reactionary or whether it is 
calculated. Through careful research of the history and motivations behind U.S.-Latin 
American Policy, inferences can be made about the future success of current anti-terrorist 
policy, and whether the need for such a policy is justifiable.  
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 The Monroe Doctrine 
In 1823, United States President James Monroe gave his first State of the Union 
address to Congress, during which he outlined his foreign policy doctrine that would later 
bare his namesake.1 Though the U.S. in no capacity had the military power to enforce this 
doctrine across North and South America, it represented a strategic shift in U.S. foreign 
policy thinking; the old world, or European powers, should no longer attempt to interfere 
or direct the new world. The Doctrine was steeped not only in the desire to prevent 
European colonization, but also in the desire to increase trade, promote inter-American 
mercantilism, and foster democratic governments.2 
The Monroe Doctrine was not just an affirmation of America’s previous 
isolationist principles, it was the first assertion that as a growing power in the new world, 
The United States would play a central role in shaping affairs in the Western hemisphere. 
Just prior to this President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, had 
negotiated the Continental Treaty with Spain, effectively acquiring Spain’s claim on the 
Pacific coast and removing the majority of Spanish power from the New World.3 The 
U.S. victory in the Mexica-American War in 1848, in which California, Arizona, New 
Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Texas were ceded to the U.S., solidified the U.S.’s strength in 
the North America.4 With the purchase of Alaska from Russian in 1867, there became no 
doubt that the U.S. was now the dominant force in the Americas, or a ‘new empire’ as 
American historian Brooks Adams noted.5 
1 "Monroe Doctrine, 1823," Office of the Historian.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 46. 
4 Ibid., 46. 
5 Brooks Adams, The New Empire. New York: Macmillan, 1902. 
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 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began to shift its 
foreign policy in the Americas. Washington’s policies pivoted from the sole acquisition 
of territory, to the formation of a sphere of influence, with the purpose of further 
cementing the growing economic and political hegemony in North and South America.6 
This pivot occurred for two main reasons: First, was the reality that there simply was very 
little easy land to be obtained, the U.S. could no longer push small Indian tribes off vast 
swaths of land or purchase land from declining powers. Further, the land that was 
populated was inhabited with people that would not easily integrate into the Anglo-Saxon 
society of the U.S., due to the racist doctrines of the time.7 Second, the very nature of 
global competition had changed; no longer was the greatness of a nation determined by 
the expanse of its physical reach, commercial might, spurned by the Second Industrial 
Revolution, began to signify superiority.8  
As the U.S. contented itself with expansion westward during the 1840’s, Great 
Britain began to expand its interests into the small isthmus between North & South 
America. Great Britain’s chargé d'affaires, Frederick Chatfield, was able to push British 
citizen’s claims against the governments of the isthmus republics, resulting in special 
trade treaties between the Great Britain and the republics.9 Chatfield further pushed for 
“British claims to the logging region in what is now Belize, to the Bay Islands off the 
Honduran Coast, and to its self-proclaimed protectorate of the ill-defined Miskito 
6 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World. 3rd ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 27-28. 
7 Ibid., 28. 
8 Ibid., 28. 
9 Thomas M. Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 1850-1903 Establishing a Relationship. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999.  80. 
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 kingdom on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast.”10 These aggressive actions naturally left the 
impression that Great Britain would move to territorialize the fledgling republics, so 
much so that the Central American republics unsuccessfully appealed to the United States 
to counter act the British advances multiple times.11 
The end of the Mexican-American War in 1848, which expanded U.S. territory to 
the Pacific Ocean, and the subsequent discovery of gold in California, quickly changed 
the previously apathetic attitude towards the isthmus. Now a route through the isthmus 
that would provide quick movement for goods and military equipment was of massive 
strategic importance. This signaled an awakening of sorts for U.S. foreign policy as the 
U.S. government would now become increasingly concerned with Central American 
politics and its effects on U.S. business interests. By the beginning of the 21st Century, 
Central America would become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. 
Removing British Influence From Central America 
Recognizing the danger that British encroachment and continued American non-
intervention posed, President James K. Polk dispatched Ephraim G. Squier as a special 
chargé d'affaires to all Central American states in 1849 to check the British presence in 
Central America.12 Squier traveled to Nicaragua and successfully signed a treaty that 
granted the United States canal rights on the San Juan River, with the obligation of 
guaranteeing its security.13 Then Squier traveled to Honduras, where he secured a treaty 
10 Ibid., 80. 
11 William R. Manning, "Central America, 1831-1850." In Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: 
Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932. 160. 
12 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 82. 
13 Ibid., 82. 
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 that ceded Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonsaca to the United States, an area that was at the 
time considered as a possible location for a trans-isthmus canal.14 
The British viewed the cession of the Tigre Islands as an unacceptable 
encroachment on British interests in the region. Infuriated, British Minister Chatfield 
ordered Royal Navy gunboats into the region to prevent the U.S. from seizing the 
island.15 Faced with the possibility of war, which neither nation particularly desired, 
leaders in Washington and London were able to avoid the crisis through the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty of 1850. The treaty specified that neither country could begin construction 
on a transisthmian transportation route, construct fortifications in the area, or “occupy, or 
fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over…any part of Central 
America.”16 It is important to note that the treaty was never discussed with the Central 
American governments, and this would become a staple of U.S. negotiations in Latin 
America. 
The treaty temporarily cooled tensions between the two nations and avoided war, 
but failed to resolve many of the regional tensions of Central America. The British 
retained their claims in Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Miskito territory in Nicaragua 
that extended as far south as the San Juan River. The river was prime importance, as it 
served as the border with Costa Rica and one of the prime locations for a transisthmian 
canal. The failure to resolve these issues would lead to a decade of diplomatic skirmishes 
between the U.S. and Great Britain.17 
14 Ibid., 82. 
15 Ibid., 82.  
16 U.S. Department of State, “The Clayton Bulwer Treaty.” 1850. 
17 Wilbur Devereux Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841-1861. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1974. Chapter 5. 
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 The first of these skirmishes occurred in Nicaragua, as the country became a key 
strategic interest after the discovery of gold, as it was the fastest way for fortune seekers 
to travel west prior to the transcontinental railroad. Greytown, a British enclave on the 
east coast of Nicaragua, became a focal point for Americans who used it as a landing 
point for transisthmian travel and it saw a massive increase in American travelers. With 
no entertainment or lodging for travelers, New York entrepreneur Commodore Cornelius 
Vanderbilt stepped into to fill the void by forming the Accessory Transit Company. By 
1852, roughly 10,000 Americans per month traveled to Greytown, enjoyed the 
amusements, gambling houses, opulent hotels, and then took steamboats through the San 
Juan River to the Pacific.18 This massive influx of American citizens and trade would 
result in another serious confrontation between the British and Americans. 
According to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty Greytown was a free port, however, the 
British badly needed revenue in order to fulfill the requirements of port municipal 
services that had exponentially increased due to the explosion of American travelers. To 
generate the needed revenue the British circumvented the law by charging harbor fees. 
Vanderbilt refused to pay for the British harbor fees because his hotel and property were 
across the bay and did not utilize any of Greytown’s harbors. The issue came to a head on 
November 21, 1851, as Vanderbilt’s Prometheus began to depart the bay for New York 
and refused to pay the British port fees. As a result, the British brig o’ war Express fired a 
three shot volley across the bow of the Prometheus, an internationally recognized 
warning to stop.19 
18 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 82. 
19 Ibid., 83. 
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 Vanderbilt, who was actually onboard the Prometheus at the time, agreed to pay 
the fees, but as soon as the ship arrived in New York proceeded to lobby his case to the 
U.S. government. Fillmore’s administration agreed with Vanderbilt and pressured the 
British to make restitution and order its naval officers in Greytown to refrain from 
pressing harbor fees until an official diplomatic agreement could be reached.20 With its 
interests in the region growing, the U.S. asserted that Great Britain had no legal authority 
to exercise any sort of jurisdiction over U.S. merchant vessels not only in Greytown, but 
also throughout Central America. Further, U.S. policymakers argued that the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty required the British to withdraw from the Miskito Coast. London was 
willing to negotiate harbor fees, but refused to vacate any ground on the premise that the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty only prevented future colonization in Central America.21 
Despite this serious disagreement, Great Britain provided an opportunity for a 
reasonable arrangement on the issues of the 1850 treaty; in 1851, Lord Palmerston 
resigned as British foreign secretary over a disagreement on European politics, 
consequently the short tempered Frederick Chatfield was recalled from Central America. 
The rise of Napoleon and other European affairs severely distracted the British, who 
sought a face saving solution for the Central American disputes. The U.S., despite its 
growing internal strife that would eventually lead to a civil war, and much to the disdain 
of the British, remained staunch in its determination to force the British from Central 
America. 
20 Ibid., 83. 
21 Mario Rodríguez, “The "Prometheus" and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.” The Journal of Modern History 36 
(3). University of Chicago Press, 1964. 270-71. 
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 The first prospect for an agreement came in 1852, when the Nicaraguan 
government pursued control over the Miskito Kingdom. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster and British Minister John Crampton debated the issue in Washington and 
London and eventually proposed a settlement in April 1852.22 Under this proposal, 
Greytown became a free city, the Miskito Indian’s would have their rights protected, and 
the San Juan River would become the definitive boundary between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua. As had been the staple of U.S.-Great Britain negotiations and treaties, neither 
the Costa Rican nor the Nicaraguan governments were consulted. Both countries 
disagreed with the settlement due to the importance of the river in transisthmian trade, 
and Nicaragua argued that continued British control of Greytown was a violation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. London however, once again posited that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
only prevented future colonization in the isthmus, and did not affect current settlements.23 
Though the British appeared to begin backpedaling in Central America, they 
remained staunch in their efforts to secure future political and commercial interests in the 
region. In March 1852, the British issued a royal warrant declaring the Roatán, Bonacca, 
and four islands off the coast of Honduras the “Colony of the Bay Islands.”24 The British 
issued the royal warrant under the false assumption that U.S. policy in the region focused 
solely around a canal project. The British ignored the Honduran government’s protests 
and the U.S. attitude solidified. The Senate Foreign Relations committee in Washington 
met and concluded that the Bay Islands were an indivisible part of Honduras, and that 
Britain should withdraw from Belize because it legally belonged to Guatemala. Further, 
22 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 83. 
23Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston, 1846-1848." The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 1936. 356-7. 
24 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 84. 
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 British interference in the region was not only a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 
but also the Monroe Doctrine.25  
James Buchanan, the new U.S. Minister, arrived in London in September 1853 
with the purpose of removing the British from the transisthmian region and Central 
America itself. The British showed no signs of relenting, with Foreign Minister Villiers 
describing British honor as requiring, “a paper regard for the interest and wellbeing of the 
Misquitos because of the old connection with them,” and that the issue of the Bay Islands 
was not up for discussion.26 The U.S. would see no headway through diplomacy until the 
end of the decade.  
While the U.S. and Great Britain remained at a diplomatic impasse, their citizens 
continued to clash in Central America, further heightening tensions. Americans continued 
to travel through Greytown in ever larger numbers, and Commodore Vanderbilt’s estate 
continued to swell in Punta Arenas, dominating both passenger and cargo traffic. 
Vanderbilt continued to refuse to pay harbor fees, and in 1853, frustrated local British 
officials took matters into their own hands and set fire to some of Vanderbilt’s buildings. 
This incident would set a tumultuous foundation for the new U.S. minister to Nicaragua, 
Solon Borland, who viewed British officials in Greytown as nothing more that “pirates 
and outlaws” from Jamaica.27 Minister Borland demanded the British provide financial 
reparations for the destruction of Vanderbilt’s property and diplomatic immunity for 
Captain T. T. Smith, who was wanted by the British for murder. The British naturally 
refused Borland’s demands outright, so Borland stood by while Captain George N. 
25 Ibid., 84. 
26 Ibid., 84. 
27 Ibid., 84. 
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 Hollins of the U.S. Navy commanded his warship, the Cyane, to bombard Greytown.28 
Though diplomatic officials of both countries looked down upon the event, no official 
reparations took place and nothing ever came of it. The razing of Greytown marks a 
turning point in U.S. foreign policy as it is the first use of gunboat diplomacy in Central 
America.  
The misplaced U.S. aggression did little to push the British out of Central 
America; instead, the British appeared to double down. In 1856, the Honduran minister to 
London, Pedro A. Herrán, settled an agreement that provided the Bay Islands as a free 
state under Honduran sovereignty, with the purpose of providing protection to British 
subjects in the region. Believing that all foreign influence should be removed from the 
region, the Honduran government rejected the deal, yet the British remained on the Bay 
Islands.29 
The British mistrust of U.S. aims in Central America steadily increased. Some 
British believed that the U.S. government supported William Walker’s nearly successful 
hostile takeover of Nicaragua.30 The already tense diplomatic atmosphere increased when 
President Buchanan avowed that the U.S. interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was 
the only correct one, and that the British were therefore illegally occupying the territory 
in Central America.31 The U.S. senate agreed, resolving that the British should abide by 
the treaty or abrogate the territory. Concerning the U.S. aggression, Britain’s First Lord 
28 James M. Woods, "Expansionism as Diplomacy: The Career of Solon Borland in Central America 1853-
1854." The Americas 40, no. 3 (1984). 413. 
29 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 85. 
30 T. J. Stiles, "The Filibuster King: The Strange Career of William Walker, the Most Dangerous 
International Criminal of the Nineteenth Century." The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. 
31 James Buchanan, "First Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union." December 8, 1857. 
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 of the Admiralty remarked: “We are fast drifting into war with the U[nited] States.”32 At 
this point the British stance on Central American policy becomes divided and seemingly 
contradictory; Lord Clarendon emphasized that the British would not succumb to U.S. 
jingoism, yet when saddled with the costs of the Crimean War seemed anxious to 
withdraw from Latin America. Lord Clarendon told the U.S. minister to London, George 
Dallas, that His Majesty’s government “would not give three coppers to retain any post 
on the Central American Territory or coast from which she could not honorably retire.”33 
Faced with U.S. and local government opposition the British began to make 
efforts to withdraw from Central America. In 1859, British Foreign Minister Lord John 
Russell sent Charles Wycke to negotiate treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua.34 Guatemalan dictator Rafael Carerra signed an agreement with Wycke that 
would allow the British to construct a cart road connecting Guatemala’s interior to the 
Caribbean coast. Wycke’s treaty with Honduras recognized the Honduran claim to the 
Bay Islands on the condition that Honduras could not transfer the islands to any third 
party or interfere with British subjects on the islands. In the final agreement in 1860, the 
British and Nicaragua agreed that the Miskito coast, including Greytown, would become 
sovereign Nicaraguan territory.   
On the surface, these treaties provided a promising British free future for the 
Central American governments, though in actuality the British would not be removed so 
easily. Rather than withdrawing from Belize, the British incorporated it into their colonial 
administrative system, christening it “British Honduras.” Further, the cart road from the 
32 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 85. 
33 Ibid., 85. 
34 Ibid., 85. 
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 coast to the interior of Guatemala was never constructed, causing a rift between the two 
nations that would last even after Belize’s independence in 1981.35  
In Nicaragua, the British accused the Nicaraguan government of failing to grant 
the Miskito Indians self-government, and in doing so refused to surrender their 
protectorate over the Indian Territory. In the 1879 arbitration case to resolve the situation, 
Emperor Franz Josef of Austria acknowledged the British control over the territory, 
which eventually would lead to foreign investment. This would serve to only complicate 
British interests in the area, by 1885, foreign entrepreneurs, many of them U.S. 
Confederate expatriates, produced enough bananas to compete in U.S. markets ranging 
from New Orleans to New York.36 Within five years, upwards of 90 percent of the 
regions wealth was controlled directly by U.S. citizens, with investments valued at $2 
million. Three years later the trade between the U.S. and these plantations was valued at 
$4 million.37 The area, in effect, became a colony of life in the Southern U.S.; private 
clubs, restaurants, estates, and a bottling plant that produced various traditional American 
drinks opened up.  
The U.S. enclave would not last though; in 1894, Nicaraguan President José 
Zelaya saw the region as a strong Nicaraguan economic asset, moved troops into the area, 
and imposed martial law throughout the Miskito Territory. With contracts voided, and 
export taxes levied, the U.S. businesses fared poorly and the U.S. government appealed to 
Zelaya directly. When appeals failed Washington took no further actions because the 
35 Ibid., 85; Wayne M. Clegern, "A Guatemalan Defense of the British Honduras Boundary of 1859." The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 40, no. 4 (1960). 573-4. 
36 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 86. 
37 Ibid., 86. 
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 expatriates were now technically residents of the foreign country and therefore subject to 
its laws.  
The British disagreed, citing the Nicaraguans failure to grant the Miskito Indians 
self-government. In March 1894, British troops landed in Bluefields to protect the rights 
of the Indians and British residents in the region. Though the British were clearly 
violating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine, the officials in 
Washington recognized that a forced removal of British presence would do more to 
damage U.S. interests in the region than to protect U.S. citizens there. Washington 
adopted a policy of chastisement without any actual interference.  
As in the 1850s, Great Britain, faced with growing problems in Europe, and grew 
weary of its commitment to the Miskito Indians. In the summer of 1894, the British 
withdrew their ships and soldiers from Bluefields and allowed the Nicaraguans to expel 
nearly 600 Jamaican administrators.38 The Nicaraguan government, realizing that the 
eyes of the U.S. and U.K. were upon them, implemented the terms of the 1860 treaty that 
incorporated the Miskito Indians into the nation, and then went further to exempt them 
from military service and personal taxes. The British withdraw pleased both the 
Nicaraguans and Washington, though the Indians and residents remained at the mercy of 
the Nicaraguan government.  
Although U.S. diplomats and politicians claimed responsibility for the British 
withdraw from the Bay Islands and the Miskito Coast, most of the responsibility belongs 
more to an evolving British policy rather than masterful U.S. diplomacy. The British, 
confronted with growing political changes on the European continent, became decidedly 
38 Ibid., 87. 
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 less interested in far away and unprofitable colonies. The failure of the U.S. to enforce 
the Monroe Doctrine on British territorial gains and actions in Nicaragua strengthened the 
Central American judgement that the Monroe doctrine was merely a self-serving work of 
rhetoric.  
With the British withdrawal from Central America, the U.S. then faced two key 
challenges to its sphere of influence in the Americas. The first was Europe’s tight 
political control over the Caribbean: every island, save for Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, was controlled by the Spanish, British, French, or Dutch.39 This stood as a 
direct contestation of the Monroe Doctrine. The second challenge came from the 
European’s commercial might in the Americas. While the U.S. maintained strong 
economic influence in Cuba and Mexico, European nations held a strong hold on South 
America. Argentina’s, Chile’s, and Peru’s largest trading partner was Great Britain, with 
Brazil also importing the majority of its goods from there. Both Germany and France 
maintained significant economic ties with Argentina and Brazil.40 The economic 
dominance of South America was so substantial that publicist William Eleroy Curtis 
testified before U.S. Congress in 1886 that the rewards of economic growth in South 
America were flowing almost wholly to “the three commercial nations of Europe,” 
England, France and Germany, which “have secured a monopoly of the trade of Spanish 
America…. [with] the Englishmen having the Brazilians by the throat.”41 
European investments in Latin America were similarly one sided towards 
Europeans. The U.S. expended a previously unheard $5.2 billion in order to finance the 
39 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 28, 30. 
40 Ibid., 28. 
41 Ibid., 28. 
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 Civil War, incurring a 3,284% increase in the national debt.42 During the early and mid-
19th century, the U.S. was in no place to export capital to Latin America. Great Britain 
was more than willing to pick up the slack, maintaining long-term investments from 
1870-1890. By 1914, Great Britain held more than half of all foreign investments in the 
region.43 The French and Germans also made significant capital investments just prior to 
and after the turn of the century.44  
 U.S. policy makers recognized that weak position that they were starting to put 
themselves in and asserted that they would need to expand exports markets. In 1881, U.S. 
Secretary of State James G. Blaine sought to expand the Monroe Doctrine with what 
would later become recognized as the Big Brother Policy. This policy sought to turn the 
Monroe Doctrine from a mere defensive weapon to keep the European powers out of the 
Americas, to an active tool to assert U.S. hegemony over the Americas through 
diplomatic collaboration and economic expansion.45 Blaine recognized that in order to 
bring about American dominance, the U.S. would have to cultivate “friendly commercial 
relations with all American countries so as would lead to a large increase in the export 
trade of the United States.”46 
  The post-Civil War economic expansion offered a promising start to foreign 
investment, increasing from an insignificant $392 million in 1870 to $1.3 billion by the 
end of the 19thcentury.47 Senator Albert J. Beveridge opened the Indiana Republican 
42 "The 19th Century." Bureau of the Public Debt. 
43 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 29. 
44 Ibid., 29. 
45 Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire: From the Revolution to Vietnam, a History of U.S. 
Imperialism. London: Pluto Press, 2003. 161. 
46 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 29. 
47 Ibid., 29. 
16 
 
                                                          
 Campaign in 1898 with a powerful speech arguing the economic need for aggressive 
American expansion, “...today we are raising more than we can consume. Today, we are 
making more than we can use. Therefore, we must find new markets for our produce, 
new occupation for our capital, new work for our labor.”48 New avenues of investment 
and increased trade were hoped to break the cycles of depression that had plagued the 
U.S.49 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 Albert Beveridge, "The March of the Flag." September 16, 1898. 
49 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 29. 
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 The Baltimore Crisis 
 The U.S. was not only interested in exorcising European influence, but also 
establishing its own hegemony over the American nations. On October 16, 1891, on the 
streets outside the True Blue Saloon in Valparaíso, Chile, a brawl between American 
sailors from the USS Baltimore and Chilean nationals left two American sailors killed, 17 
wounded (five seriously), and many arrested.50 This seemingly inconsequential skirmish 
would ignite a diplomatic crisis that would put the two nations on the path to a possible 
war. 
 Strains in the U.S.-Chilean relationship dated back about a decade before the 
Baltimore Affair. James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Garfield, supported 
Peru over Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), accusing Chile of overt military 
aggression encouraged by the British.51 Chile would win the war, establishing its military 
superiority in the Pacific coast of South America. With the desire to increase U.S. trade in 
Latin America, Blaine was highly critical of British investment in Chile. Although 
Chilean nationalists shared an anti-British sentiment with the U.S., they were still 
extremely wary of American Motives. 
 When Chile became embroiled in a civil war in early 1891, the U.S. supported the 
established Balmaceda government, while the British supported the rebels known as the 
“Congressionalists.” In May 1891, the U.S., in response to a Balmacedan government 
request, apprehended a Chilean rebel ship, the Itata, which was loaded with arms in San 
50 Robert Kennedy, "The U.S.S. Baltimore Affair." N.Y. Times.  
51 Ibid. 
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 Diego, California, and headed toward Chile.52 When the Congressionalists won the war, 
President Harrison released the Itata and recognized the Chilean government, but the 
entire preceding string of events left a bitter taste in Chilean mouths.  
 Tension remained so high between the two rising powers that the U.S. 
Department of the Navy drafted contingency plans in the event of war. U.S. Minister to 
Chile, Patrick Egan, caused further friction by granting asylum to leaders of the defeated 
Balmaceda faction, who were taking refuge in the American mission.53 Egan refused 
Chilean orders to hand over the refugees, and in October 1891, Chilean secret police 
surrounded the mission to prevent the refugees’ escape. 
 In addition to the political turmoil, the U.S. and Chile were on an economic crash 
course. By 1890, Chile had surpassed Peru as the most energetic and powerful 
commercial nation in South America.54 Further, Chile had the highest per capita income 
of all nations in Latin America, and was exceeded on the European continent only by 
Britain, Belgium and Holland in terms of per capita imports.55 Following the revolution 
Chile appeared the most politically stable Latin American nation, and with its excess of 
natural resources, it was heavily favored by European investors.  
 By the beginning of the Baltimore Affair, the Chilean government looked upon 
the U.S. government with a sense of loathing, and rightfully so; the American 
government had supported the government they overtopped, criticized its largest trading 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Joyce S. Goldberg, "Consent to Ascent. The Baltimore Affair and the U. S. Rise to World Power Status." 
The Americas 41, no. 1 (1984). 25. 
55 Ibid., 25. 
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 partner, withheld weapons that could have shortened the civil war, and sheltered 
members of the overtopped government.   
The U.S. Navy in Chile 
Valparaíso, at the time was a thriving commercial center and naval hub for South 
America. After the Chilean civil war and the decline of the Peruvian port of Callo, 
Valparaíso became the maritime capital of the Pacific, and a focus for naval enterprises 
for continental defense.56 North American traders frequented the port, and it grew into a 
bustling, industrious, and prosperous city. As such, it was no surprise to see a ship of the 
U.S. Pacific Squadron, such as the U.S. S. Baltimore, there in 1891. 
 The U.S.S Baltimore was not just any ship though, it was a considerable vessel 
for its time. Displacing over 4,600 tons and sporting twelve breech-loading guns of 
various sizes the Baltimore was one of three first-rate vessels in the U.S. Navy. Secretary 
of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy proudly boasted of the Baltimore as “undoubtedly the 
fastest ship of her displacement in the world. She can whip any that can catch her and run 
away from any ship that can whip her.”57 Captaining the Baltimore was Winfield Scott 
Schley, Naval Academy graduate and future Rear Admiral. Schley was known as a 
raconteur, unreserved, and enthusiastic with an inclination for impulsivity and eager for 
action. 
 The Baltimore was one of several U.S. Navy ships ordered to Chilean waters 
during the Revolution in January of 1891. Minister Eagan had asked for naval assets to 
protect American interest during the tumultuous civil war. Captain Schley and the 
Baltimore steamed from France to Valparaiso, where Schley reported that the presence of 
56 Ibid., 21. 
57 Ibid., 22. 
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 the Baltimore gave satisfied and contributed to the security of Americans living in 
Chile.58 Rear Admiral W. P. McCann, commander of the U.S.S. Pensacola and U.S. 
naval forces in the South Pacific, corroborated Schley’s statement when he cabled 
Secretary Tray that the “arrival of the Baltimore on this station has attracted a great deal 
of attention, and has also had a very good effect in increasing the respect of these people 
for our navy and showing them that the United States had the power to protect the 
interests of her citizens should it become necessary to do so.”59 
 The Baltimore remained in Valparaiso throughout the civil war, taking no action, 
acting as a not so subtle reminder that of U.S. interest. The Congressionalists victory 
Battle of Placilla on August 28 and overthrew the Balmaceda government should have 
lessened the need for a U.S. warship. Rear Admiral Brown telegraphed Tracy, explaining 
that a “perfect order” existed between Santiago and Valparaiso and that naval warships 
would not improve the situation.60 Despite this, Captain Schley was ordered not to move 
and the Baltimore remained in Valparaiso. 
Sailors and Natives Clash 
 
 Friday, October 16, 1891, clear skies and gentle breezes prevailed in Valparaiso, 
and 117 crewmembers from the Baltimore were granted a twenty-four hour liberty. 
Because of the civil war, the crew had not been granted shore leave since late July or 
early August in Coquimbo, unlike the crews of foreign naval vessels who had received 
58 Ibid., 22. 
59 Message of the President of the United States Respecting the Relations with Chile, Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1892. 247. 
60 Ibid., 288. 
21 
 
                                                          
 liberty throughout the civil war in Valparaiso.61 When the Baltimore had returned to 
Valparaiso on September 14, the captain of the Valparaiso Port Authority and the senior 
Chilean naval officer in the port visited the Baltimore to render the traditional welcome, 
courtesies, and hospitalities. Captain Schley had question the Intendente, Juan de Dios 
Arlegüi, about the possibility of shore leave, and Arlegüi replied that he could find no 
reason to withhold a privilege that was being enjoyed by other crews.62 Despite this, 
Schley cabled Tracy that he felt “strong feeling and great hostility” against Americans, 
and that although everything was quiet, the threat of what might happen had prevented 
him from granting liberty.63 It was not until over a month later that Schley believed he 
saw a change in Chilean attitude and reported, “Everything is quiet at Valparaiso, and the 
chances of everything being more settled improve daily.”64 Only then did he deem it safe 
for his sailors to go ashore and granted them liberty. 
 Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the riot outside the True Blue Saloon 
killed two sailors and wounded many others. President Harrison, who was already upset 
over the refugee dispute, became deeply angered when news of the casualties trickled in. 
The United States government demanded, "Prompt and full reparation proportionate to 
the gravity of the injury inflicted," from Chile.65 The Chilean foreign minister, Manuel 
Matta, responded by promising nothing until the judicial process was completed. Both 
sides blamed the altercation on the other, though some Americans believed that it was a 
deliberate planned assault on American sailors. The prolonged length of the judicial 
61 Goldberg, “Consent to Ascent.” 23. 
62 Winfield Scott Schley, Forty-five Years under the Flag. New York: D. Appleton and, 1904. 221-22. 
63 Message of the President, 290. 
64 Ibid., 292. 
65 Ibid., 120. 
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 investigation upset many Americans, who interpreted as a refusal to accept responsibility, 
express the expected regret, punish the murderers, and make reparations for the death of 
U.S. service members.66 
 The tense situation temporarily cooled for a few weeks until inflammatory 
remarks on each side brought the controversy to the forefront of international politics. In 
the President’s 1891 State of the Union address in December, President Harrison blamed 
the Baltimore affair on Chile and criticized the “couched offensive tone” of Chilean 
Foreign Affairs Secretary Matta.67 Two days later Secretary Matta publicly responded, 
declaring the American government was insincere, wrong, and bellicose in its treatment 
of the Baltimore affair.68 This outright rebuke of the U.S. government further incensed 
President Harrison, and Eagan broke off all communication with the Chilean government.  
European Noninvolvement  
 
 The European powers watched the events with concern as the U.S. pushed closer 
to war with Chile, who the Europeans regarded as the most prominent civilized and free 
nation in South America.69 President Harrison threatened war in an ultimatum sent to 
Chile on January 23, 1892, and then again in a special message to Congress on January 
25, after the Chilean government had yet to respond to the earlier ultimatum. The Chilean 
minister in Paris, Augusto Matte, believed that the “influence that the European press 
exercises on public opinion in the United States,” could help quell the calls for war.70 
66 Goldberg, “Consent to Ascent.” 26. 
67 President Benjamin Harrison, "Third Annual Message." December 9, 1891. 
68 Kennedy, "The U.S.S. Baltimore Affair." 3. 
69 Goldberg, “Consent to Ascent.” 25. 
70 Ibid., 26. 
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 Through careful maneuvering Matte was able to ensure that the most prominent European 
newspapers favored the Chilean side, relying upon the sympathy for the rising 
democracy, and the “disfavor that the United States has in Europe due to its economic 
policy.”71  
 Minister Matte even arranged to meet James Gordon Bennet, who owned the New 
York Herald, and lived in Paris, to discuss how European media might affect the 
international relationships of the U.S. Despite all of Matte’s efforts, there was no change 
in U.S. actions; the conversation with Bennet proved ineffective, and though the 
Europeans showed sympathy for the Chileans, they advised Chile to avoid conflict with 
the U.S. no matter the merits of the Chilean position. Despite Le Temps, Les Debates, La 
Justice, and Le Soir publishing editorials condemning the war hawk U.S. diplomacy, the 
French remained firm in their desire to remain uninvolved. 
 Foreign nations, who recognized the merit of the Chilean position, refused to even 
mediate the conflict between the two nations. Matte reported to the Chilean Ministry of 
Exterior Relations, that Britain would not mediate due to “accented animosities” toward 
the U.S.; Germany would not due to “serious” differences with North America; and Italy 
was unable to due to pending questions concerning the New Orleans lynching (in which 
in 1890 U.S. citizens had stormed a prison in New Orleans and murdered several Italians 
who had just been found innocent of killing the city police chief).72 Spain, as the parent 
country of Chile, was unable to mediate the conflict as it looked “with vivid repugnance 
on United States intervention in South America.”73 The Swiss minister advised the Swiss 
71 Ibid., 26. 
72 Ibid., 27. 
73 Ibid., 27. 
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 government that the notion of war over the Baltimore affair as an “absurdity” since the 
North American public seemed hesitant to go to war, but that it remained a possibility, as 
Chile seemed unwilling to make any sort of concessions. The Brazilian minister, 
Salvador de Medoça, made an effort to get his government to mediate the conflict, but the 
Brazilian government declined to do so.  
 Of any European power that would intervene, Germany was one of the few that 
showed the most promise. The Chilean minister in Berlin, Gonzalo Bulnes, had meetings 
with Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, German Minister of State, who had reports from 
the German minister in the U.S. that a war between Chile and the U.S. was imminent.74 
Bieberstein concluded that the U.S. was motivated by a desire for commercial monopoly 
of South America, with the Baltimore affair acting merely as a pretext for excluding 
European economic activity and replacing it with U.S. activity. Minister Bulnes reasoned 
that the Chilean cause of defending a countries sovereign commercial interests was also 
defending European investors interests, and therefore worthy of support. Indeed, the 
former chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, had stated with amazement, “A nation as powerful 
as the American Union did not show more moderation and respect for a nation as small as 
Chile, that had just come out of a civil war, and insisted in imposing on it the same 
qualities that they condemned in the riot.”75 Despite these promising signs of support, 
Bieberstein made it clear that it was squarely on Chile’s shoulders to weather the conflict, 
and that though the German government sympathized with the Chilean cause, no concrete 
aid would be provided. Bieberstein reasoned that the U.S. was clearly “seeking the 
74 Ibid., 27-28. 
75 Ibid., 28. 
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 pretext for a war” and that Chile should do everything in its power to thwart the 
fabrication of a casus belli.76 
 The British also showed a marked interest with the Chilean government in the 
Baltimore affaire. The British Foreign office first believed that the trouble had been a 
result of Minister Egan’s appointment, which had been regarded with great displeasure 
by the Chilean government, or that the entire conflict was a result of actions that neither 
side had control over.77 The affair was thought to be so unsubstantial that the London 
Times reported on October 30, “little or no excitement has been caused in official 
circles.”78 John Kennedy, the British minister to Chile, described the Baltimore affair as, 
“merely a question of temper.”79 
 Though viewed as a question of temper, the British still remained concerned that 
over the affair. Kennedy wrote the Foreign Office that,  
Mr. Egan and Captain Schley have changed their previous prudent attitude for one 
of defiance; this may be explained by their conviction that patience and prudence 
under direct insults to the United States Flag have been in vain and that the best 
way to put an end to the systematic annoyance to which they have been subjected 
was by obtaining authority to defy and threaten the Chilean government.80 
76 Ibid., 28. 
77 Ibid., 28. 
78 Ibid., 28. 
79 Ibid., 28. 
80 Ibid., 28. 
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 Captain Schley’s “probably exaggerated language to his foreign colleagues at 
Valparaiso” worried Kennedy so greatly that he recommended the return of British war 
ships to the coast.81 
By December 31, the Foreign Office had realized the magnitude of the situation, 
and suggested that Chilean Foreign Minister Manuel Antonio Matta be removed from 
office for the aggressive and undiplomatic note that he had sent the U.S. in December, for 
fear that the two countries would go to war otherwise. Minister Kennedy had tried, in 
vein, to persuade Matta to use more tactile language in order to introduce friendliness and 
calm between the two nations.   Kennedy predicted that because of Matta’s failure, his 
successor would “certainly be compelled to drop the defiant attitude hitherto observed 
toward the United States and also to make concessions to the demands of that Country.”82 
The British certainly sympathized with Chile (due in no small part to their massive 
economic interests in the area), but as with the other European powers, would not start or 
join a campaign against the United States.  
The Crisis Ends  
 
On January 1, 1892, Kennedy’s prediction proved true, the Chilean administration 
replaced Matta with a more peacemaking foreign minister, Luis Pereira. Pereira met 
courteously with Egan and agreed to have the secret police removed and allow the 
refugees to leave Chile without threat of arrest. On January 6, the Chilean court 
investigating the affair indicted three Chileans and an American for their involvement in 
the affair.  
81 Ibid., 29. 
82 Ibid., 29. 
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 As the diplomatic dispute began to wind down the Chilean government once 
again fanned the flames as it asked that Egan be removed as the U.S. Minister. President 
Harrison reacted quickly, sending a threateningly worded message to Chile, rejecting the 
Chilean court’s findings, labeling the Baltimore incident as a deliberate attack on 
American service personnel, ruling out the discussion on Mr. Egan’s position, and 
demanding, “A suitable apology and…adequate reparation for the injury done to this 
government.”83 President Harrison presented the correspondence to Congress, with the 
aim of gearing the government to war.  
On January 25, 1892, the Chilean administration, at the entreaty of European 
ministers for fear of war, conceded on all of President Harrison’s points. In February, a 
Chilean court gave prison sentences for the three Chilean rioters, and in July, the Chilean 
government agreed to pay the United States $75,000 in gold bullion as reparation.84 
Minister Egan would remain until President Cleveland fired him in 1893 for again 
offering asylum during another Chilean civil war. Thus, the hegemony of the U.S. in 
American politics was further cemented in the minds of Europeans and Latin American 
Governments.  
U.S. Naval Machinations 
 
Unknown to the Chileans, but certainly bearing on the affair, the U.S.S. Baltimore 
itself was representative of an effort by the U.S. to build a new navy of considerable 
scope, second to none. The goal of becoming a world class naval power did not start with 
83 Benjamin Harrison, "Message to Congress Reporting on Correspondence Between the United States and 
Chile Regarding Violence Against American Sailors in Valparaiso." January 25, 1892. 
84 Kennedy, "The U.S.S. Baltimore Affair." 4. 
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 the Republican administration that had ascended to office in March 1889, but the 
articulation of strong naval principles and organization of public opinion distinguished 
President Harrison and Secretary Tracy as the founding fathers of the “new navy” and 
American expansionism.  
As the U.S. sought to improve its international position and looked to establish 
itself as the dominant nation in the hemisphere, it came to the realization that its navy 
was dwarfed and embarrassed by nations considered of lesser status, like Chile.85 In 
1884, Senator Eugene Haile of Maine described the U.S. Navy with “a sense of shame... 
There is nothing whatever to prevent Chile or any other South American power which 
has in its possession...a second or third rate ironclad from steaming along the Pacific 
coast and laying our towns under contribution, and burning and destroying."86 In 1881, 
the Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt, reported to Congress that unless it took 
action the navy would spiral into insignificance: "We have been unable to make such an 
appropriate display of our naval power abroad as will cause us to be respected. The 
exhibition of our weakness in this important arm of defense is calculated to detract from 
our occupying in the eyes of foreign nations that rank to which we know ourselves to be 
justly entitled.”87 President Arthur recognized the deplorable state of the U.S. Navy and 
signed a bill appropriating funds for the Navy’s first steel vessels, one of which the 
U.S.S. Baltimore.88 
85 George Theron Davis, A Navy Second to None; the Development of Modern American Naval Policy. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and, 1940. 33. 
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Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. 143. 
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 President Arthur’s decision was do in no small part to the awareness of the state 
of the U.S. Navy in the Americas. Each of the two British built Chilean ironclads that 
fought in the War of the Pacific in 1879 were considered superior to that of any vessel in 
the U.S. Naval arsenal.89 In 1885, Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, in his 
annual report to congress, mentioned the new Chilean steel cruiser Esmerelda, describing 
it as the “most perfect ship of her class ever built… [a] more formidable vessel than 
either the Boston or Atlanta…unsurpassed as a cruising commerce destroyer.”90 Just 
before arriving in Washington, Theodore Roosevelt wrote President Harrison that “it is a 
disgrace to us as a nation that we should have no war ships worth of the name, and that 
our rich sea-board cities should lie at the mercy of a tenth rate country like Chili [sic].”91 
Secretary Tracy realized that even after his plans for expansion were executed 
successfully, the U.S. would be “absolutely at the mercy of states having less than one-
tenth of its population, one-thirtieth of its wealth, and one-one hundredth of its area.”92 
The disgraceful state of the U.S. Navy was not only noticed by government officials, 
Scientific American lamented, “We have no navy worthy of the name, and nearly all our 
seaports are without proper defenses… at the mercy of any single piratical boat that 
chooses to enter. This is a very humiliating position for a country like ours to be placed 
in.”93 
89 Donald E. Worcester, "Naval Strategy in the War of the Pacific." Journal of Inter-American Studies, 1963. 
37. 
90 William E. Chandler, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. United States Naval Department. 1884. 
62. 
91 Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1925. 63. 
92 Benjamin F. Tracy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. United States Naval Department. 1889.  
93 Scientific American Vol. 64. #20, (May 16, 1891). 358. 
30 
 
                                                          
 The U.S. Navy, in 1890, was still far behind Britain, France, Russia, and 
Germany, and even lesser powers as, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Turkey, 
China, Norway-Sweden, and Austria-Hungary.94 The early 1880’s push for naval funds 
and subsequent building did pay off though; by the end of Benjamin Harrison’s 
presidency, the U.S. navy had advanced in tonnage and ship numbers from twelfth to 
about fifth place.95 This evolution from weakness to strength was achieved through the 
leadership of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy, who is credited with the rebirth of 
the Naval Department and the advocacy of a “two-ocean navy.”96 Through his vigor and 
efficiency, Secretary Tracy was able to gain the loyalty of his subordinates and the trust 
of the navy. Tracy recognized the importance of public approval; upon the 
commissioning U.S.S. Chicago, the largest U.S. cruiser at the time, Tracy sent it and its 
two sister cruisers, the U.S.S. Atlanta and the U.S.S. Boston, to ports along the Atlantic 
seaboard, where the public marveled at the display of naval technology.97 Secretary 
Tracy then set the precedent of naming new battleships after states and new cruisers after 
cities, a policy that still holds to this day.98 Arguably, Secretary Tracy’s greatest 
achievement was not the mere increase in tonnage, but the development of naval yards 
capable of turning out warships that could compete with the best of any naval power.99 
 Secretary Tracy pushed for the buildup of the U.S. Navy not because of the 
Baltimore affair, but because of those kinds of incidents; Tracy believed that the U.S. had 
94 Goldberg, “Consent to Ascent.” 31. 
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 a need to display its naval power so that the world would pay the proper attention to the 
growing power of the U.S. The Baltimore affair was an indication the change in policy 
that was occurring: the U.S. would now win prestige, respect, and power status through 
aggressive assertion. The extensive preparations for war even prior to the ultimatum 
further support this.  
In the 1890s, the most powerful nations on their respective continents were Chile 
and the U.S. The Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific set it up as the primary naval 
power in the America’s, while the U.S. pursued the expansion of its economic and 
strategic influence. The U.S. sought to assert its hegemony in the western hemisphere and 
cement its reputation in the world through threats of war. By the end of the crisis, it was 
clear that the final page of the isolationism chapter in America’s history had been turned, 
and a new, aggressive United States had emerged.   
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  The Spanish American War 
 The aggressive rhetoric in Chile was just a glimpse of future U.S. foreign policy 
in Latin America. As the European powers began to relinquish control of the Americas, 
the U.S. rushed in to fill the economic and political void. By the turn of the 20th century, 
the U.S. would become embroiled in a war with Spain over Cuba, and the ensuing 
occupation of the largest island in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 By the midway point of the 19th century, Cuba was deep in the throes of 
insurrection, a time of constant conspiracies and rumors that would never come to 
fruition. The future of Cuba was uncertain, and economic difficulties contributed to 
island wide feelings of discontent. Cuban Creoles were deeply dissatisfied with Spanish 
rule, as Spain had imposed seemingly arbitrary taxes, discriminatory tariffs, and other 
levees that were viewed as purposefully harmful to the growing level of trade between 
the U.S. and Cuba.100 This economic conflict would eventually become the main point of 
contention between the peninsular authorities and the Creole producers. The divide was 
magnified further as the U.S. overtook Spain as Cuba’s primary trading partner.  
 This divide became apparent in both Cuba and the U.S., causing annexationists 
movements to gain steam in the 1840’s and 50’s. As expansionist sentiment garnered 
popularity, political pressure followed; in 1848, President James K. Polk offered $100 
million to Spain for Cuba, and then President Franklin Pierce raised the sum to $130 
million in 1854, once again without success. After this second refusal, the U.S. ministers 
to Spain, France, and England met in Ostend, Belgium to publicly urge the U.S. to 
100 Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations. 35. 
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 continue its efforts to purchase Cuba. The Ostend Manifesto, as it would later become 
known as, warned Spain that if it refused to sell Cuba then it could be expected that, “by 
every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we 
possess the power.”101 
 The U.S. annexation efforts did not go unnoticed in Cuba, and in part increased 
Cuban expectations and encouraged hope of imminent annexation. The Cubans viewed 
the Texan annexation with a glimmer of hope, as the Texas settlers had seceded from 
Mexico and joined the U.S. These efforts would ultimately fizzle out, as the U.S. became 
increasingly focused on difficult domestic issues. Once the U.S. Civil War drew to a 
close it became clear that Cuba, a slave territory, would not fit into the Union as 
seamlessly as some previously suggested. Evolving domestic policies made it unlikely 
that Cuba would be assimilated into the United States. 
 Sentiments and conditions evolved in Cuba during this time as well. The fervent 
support for annexation that had petered out left many Cubans disillusioned, with resigned 
support. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 had a profound effect on Cuban 
sugar planters, who had looked at annexation as a way to save slavery in Cuba. After the 
Civil War the sugar planters became some of the most vocal critics of U.S. annexation for 
the same reasons. 
 While the U.S. was in the midst of reconstruction, Cuba became engrossed in its 
own internal problems. A new conservative ministry in Spain created waves of 
antidemocratic laws in Cuba. Opposition journalists were silenced, critics exiled, 
meetings of any political nature were strictly prohibited, and any outspoken opponents 
101 U.S. Congress, House, The Ostend Manifesto. October 18, 1854. 33rd Cong., 2 Sess., Vol X. pp. 127-136. 
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 were imprisoned. At the same time, Spain re-imposed old taxes and levied new ones, 
imposing strict protectionist duties on foreign goods that amounted to four times the price 
of Spanish goods. These duties were particularly burdensome on the Cubans, who relied 
heavily upon foreign goods, and caused further harm when the U.S. counter levied a 10 
percent tariff on Cuban goods.102  
 Steep new taxes are inconvenient at any time, but were especially problematic 
during this time. The taxes directly caused the Cuban economy to plunge into a deep 
recession: sugar production plummeted causing sugar prices to fall to their lowest point 
in fifteen years.103 Then, in December of 1868, the major banks on Cuba withheld 
payments, bringing sugar payments to a halt, and further contributing to the pervasive 
climate of uncertainty.104 
 The Creoles, discontent with the economic uncertainty and without the likelihood 
of gaining relief through reforms, began to rise in popularity and seek remedy through 
revolution. By 1868, established representatives of eastern Cuban creole bourgeoisie, 
"cattle barons from Camagüey and sugar planters from Oriente-Carlos Manuel de 
Céspedes, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Francisco Vicente Aguilera, Bartolomé Masó, 
Pedro Figueredo, and Ignacio Agramonte" were deeply involved in anti-Spanish 
conspiracies.105   
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 The First Cuban War for Independence   
 On October 10, 1868, the Grito de Yara (Ten Years War) kicked off a 
revolutionary period in Cuba that called for complete independence from Spain. The 
rebellion quickly expanded from east to west; spreading first throughout the Oriente 
province, then west into Camagüey, and eventually reaching nearly halfway across the 
island into the east of the Las Villas province. By the early 1870s, the creole uprising had 
gained more than 40,000 supporters.106  
 From the outset, the U.S. took a dim view of the rebellion and pursued a two 
pronged policy approach with Cuba: oppose Cuban independence and support Spanish 
sovereignty. The U.S., unable to acquire Cuba from Spain, resigned itself to an 
alternative approach to Cuban annexation; Cuba could remain outside of the U.S. only as 
long as it remained a Spanish territory. This principle, which came to be known as "no 
transfer," would become the bedrock for U.S.-Cuban policy in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The “no transfer” principal was based upon numerous corollary 
tenants, the chief of which was a U.S. commitment to defend the Spanish sovereignty 
against challengers, internal as well as external.107 U.S. officials firmly believed that 
Cuban annexation was only a matter of time as long Cuba remained under Spanish rule 
and did not pass to any third party. Spanish sovereignty over the island played into U.S. 
interests, it was considered a temporary necessity for the anticipated eventual transfer of 
the island into U.S. hands.  
 The decay of Spanish control over Cuba was viewed by many in the United States 
as a final act of turmoil that would result in the annexation of Cuba. Throughout the 19th 
106 Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. 93. 
107 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 37. 
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 century the U.S. had maintained the status quo and defended the Spanish claim over the 
island from both internal and external challengers, if only for the eventual goal of 
securing the island. In 1823, Thomas Jefferson advised President James Monroe to 
"oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any power, either as auxiliary, 
stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially [Cuba's] transfer to 
any power, by conquest, cession or in any other way."108  Two decades later, Secretary of 
State John Forsyth instructed the U.S. minister in Madrid to reassure the Spanish 
government that "in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this 
portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of 
the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it."109 In 1849, Secretary of State 
John M. Clary reiterated the U.S. policy on a non-Spanish Cuba: "The news of the 
cession of Cuba to any foreign power would, in the United States, be the instant signal for 
war."110 
 The notion that Spain would eventually cede Cuba to the United States was 
predicated on the maintenance of Spanish colonial rule. Until Spain itself proved 
incapable of governing the island, the U.S. would support Spanish sovereignty over the 
island as an effective alternative to annexation. Guaranteeing Cuba’s “independence 
against all the world except Spain,” Thomas Jefferson asserted, “would be nearly as 
108 Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, October 24, 1823. United States Congress, 
Senate. 
109 United States Congress, Senate, The Miscellaneous Documents of the Senate of the United States for 
the First Session of the Forty-ninth Congress, 1885-'86. Washington: G.P.O., 1886. 373. 
110 John Bassett Moore and Francis Wharton, A Digest of International Law. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 
1906. 452. 
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 valuable to us as if it were our own.”111 Later the U.S. minister to Spain, John Forsyth, 
would further assure the Spanish that the U.S. “interests required, as there was no 
prospect of [Cuba] passing into our hands, that it should belong to Spain.”112 
 Throughout the Ten Years War (1868-78), the Cuban insurgency appealed to the 
U.S. for belligerency status, but was consistently denied. President Ulysses S. Grant 
asserted that recognition of the Cuban provisional government would be, “impracticable 
and indefensible,” and that the granting of belligerent status would be, “unwise and 
premature.”113 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish had serious concerns over the intellectual 
and moral quality the Cuban population of Indians, Africans, and Spaniards and doubted 
their ability to self-govern.114 While Fish comprehended that Cuban independence from 
Spain was eventually inevitable, the proposition that the separation would result in Cuban 
sovereignty was quite a different matter, and was heavily resisted in Washington.  
  Because of these policies and assurances, the United States sustained its 
commitment to Spanish sovereignty throughout the Ten Years War. However, the U.S. 
urged the Spanish to consider reforms to appeal to the Cubans and to end the war with 
Spanish control over the island control. President Grant even offered to mediate an 
agreement between the creole insurgents and the Spanish in order to maintain colonial 
rule in exchange for reform. 
111 Thomas Jefferson, Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies from the Papers of T. Jefferson. 
Charlottesville: F. Carr & Co, 1829. 367. 
112 Correspondence between the United States, Spain, and France: Concerning Alleged Projects of Conquest 
and Annexation of the Island of Cuba, London: Printed by Harrison and Son, 1853. 19. 
113 Ulysses S. Grant, Seventh Annual Message to Congress. December 7th, 1875. 
114 Nevins, Joseph Allan, Hamilton Fish. The Inner History of the Grant Administration. New York: Dodd, 
Mead &, 1937. 176-201. 
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  Though the U.S. remained unwilling to consider annexation with the Cubans, it 
continued to try to negotiate with the Spanish for the acquisition of the island itself. 
Secretary Fish presumed that a prolonged and destructive war in Cuba would make Spain 
realize that the cost of keeping the island was too great and Spain then would part with 
the island. In a cabinet meeting in April 1869, Secretary of State Fish asserted that the 
Cuban revolt would expose the "madness and fatuity" of Spain's continued control over 
the island. Eventually, the revolt would produce "a condition of affairs, a state of feeling 
that would compel all the civilized nations to regard the Spanish rule as an international 
nuisance, which must be abated, when they would all be glad that we should interpose 
and regulate control of the Island."115 Throughout the insurrection, the Grant 
administration made continuous inquiries and offers to purchase the island. 
 By the late 1870’s, however, the Spanish were establishing military superiority 
and ending the war. During the closing period of the conflict, Spain discussed with the 
Cubans the terms of political reconciliation, promising reforms that would eventually act 
as the foundation of the peace settlement. Under the Pact of Zanjón, signed in February 
1878, the Spanish committed to political reforms and economic concessions, with the 
insurgents agreeing to lay down their arms in return for amnesty.116 
Integration into the U.S. Economy 
 The Ten Years War marked a turning point for Cuba during the nineteenth 
century. After 1878, Spain worked to remedy some of the structural sources of Cuban 
disgruntlement, abolished the slave trade, and improved trade policies. In 1884 and 1886, 
115 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 38. 
116 Ibid., 38. 
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 the Spanish negotiated limited reciprocal trade agreements with the U.S. to eliminate the 
differential flag system and some of the most burdensome import duties and levies. The 
political reforms started promisingly, and early indications pointed to Spain actually 
making good on its commitment to institute colonial reforms. 
 Despite this, as some of the more pronounced contradictions of the colonial 
economy started to become more noticeable it gave rise to a new direction for the pursuit 
of Cuban sovereignty. The Ten Years War had a prolonged influence on Cuban internal 
development and international relations in the years that followed. The disruption of 
Cuban sugar production throughout the war had allowed sugar producers elsewhere to 
seize upon the lack of supply and expand. Sugar cane production had increased across 
Latin American and Asia, and beet sugar production had expanded in Europe, resulting in 
a robust challenge to the former Cuban monopoly of sugar on the world market.117 
 This challenge would lead to economic crisis in Cuba. With the sugar prices 
collapsing, the island saw its primary source of income dwindle, resulting in a deep 
depression. Seven of Cuba’s largest trading corporations went under, the islands banks 
closed, and the business houses collapsed. In the first quarter of 1884, the Cuban business 
failures amounted to more than $7 million.118  
 The freefall of the Cuban economy provided a ripe opportunity for U.S. economic 
expansion into the colonial economy. For about a hundred years, the Cuban economy had 
been structuring and developing itself around a close commercial relationship with the 
U.S., becoming increasingly dependent on U.S. markets, capital, and imports. This 
economic relationship had molded Cuban production strategies, swayed local goods and 
117 Ibid., 39. 
118 Ibid., 39. 
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 consumption, and inevitably, the trajectory of Cuban politics. By 1878, the U.S. 
economic relation had shaped the Cuban economy to assume new forms and functions; 
Cuban producers were desperate for new sources of capital and credit, which were 
unavailable from Spanish banks or creditors. The Cubans then turned towards the U.S. 
with long term, permanent consequences. Credit transactions between the U.S. and Cuba 
increased in both volume and value throughout the 1880s, and helped many organizations 
stave off bankruptcy119 
 The prevention of bankruptcy was only temporary though, and the economic 
climate on the island did not improve. This led many of the Cuban planters to slide back 
into bankruptcy and lose their property to U.S. investors. In the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, through initial foreclosures and subsequent sales by planters in 
financial trouble, U.S. ownership of property in Cuba expanded. Despite many of the 
planters surviving the crisis during the 1880s, they paid for their survival at the cost of 
their traditional supremacy over the production process. The price of meeting their long-
term financial commitments was increasing displacement and eventual dependency on 
the U.S. financial market. Across Cuba, the grip of the creole planter classer over 
production and distribution slipped, foreshadowing the classes’ eventual demise. 
 The province of Cienfuegos serves as a prime example of the transformation that 
was taking place in colonial sugar production. In 1883 U.S. Consul William P. Pierce 
reported that,” For the last ten or fifteen years, every sugar estate in the jurisdiction of 
Cienfuegos has either changed ownership by reason of debt or is now encumbered with 
debts to an amount approximating the value of the estate.” Pierce specified that the 
119 Ibid., 39. 
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 Cuban planter had borrowed heavily from U.S. investors despite exorbitant interest rates 
in order to “obtain more capital to preserve that which he had,” because the planters 
believed that “it was the only plank that [they] could hope to float through his troubles.” 
Pierce unsympathetically concluded that the “planter…has so far failed in his calculations 
and he may lose the title to his estate.120 
 Pierce’s conclusions did not take long to come to fruition. Starting in early 1884, 
Edwin Atkins and Company based in Boston foreclosed on the Soledad estate owned by 
Juan Sarria, the Carlota plantation from the Ramón de la Torriente family, the Caledonia 
estate from the heirs of Diego Juláin Sánchez, the Guábairo property from Manuel 
Blanco, the Linomes farm from the Vilá family, and the Brazo estate from the Torre 
family. The impoverished Carlos Iznaga family sold Vega Vieja, Manaca, and leased 
Algoba to Atkins. Atkins then purchased the Santa Teresa plantation from Juan Pérez 
Galdos, Veguitas from José Porrúa, Vaquería from the Barrallaza family, the San 
Augustín estate from Tómas Terry, and the Rosario farm from Juan Sarria. The Atkins 
family was then able to secure long-term leases on San José, Viamones, and San 
Esteban.121 These are just a handful of examples of an individual organization acquiring 
large swaths of land in Cuba, numerous companies and investors were expanding all 
throughout the island. Eaton Stafford and Company, a New York banking firm, acquired 
several sugar estates between Cienfuegos and Trinidad. U.S. merchant William Steward 
acquired the 4,500-acre La Carolina estate. Then, in 1892, the American Refining 
120 William P. Pierce to John Davis, 20 August 1883, Despatches[sic] from United States Consuls in 
Cienfuegos, 1876-1906. Washington: National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General 
Services Administration, 1961. 
121 Edwin Farnsworth Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba: Reminiscences of Edwin F. Atkins. Cambridge, Mass: 
Riverside Press, 1926. 30-137. 
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 Company acquired the Trinidad Sugar Company. The E. & L. Ponvert brothers from 
Boston obtained the 4,000-acre Hormiguero estate in Palmira, then either bought out or 
foreclosed on the surround properties to increase their land.122 
 Throughout the last few decades of the nineteenth century, the U.S. expanded its 
presence in Cuba in all directions, from Havana and the provinces, to all sectors of the 
economy. U.S. citizens did not just invest in Cuba; they took up residence there, 
broadening their roles and importance. They arrived and managed sugar mills, oversaw 
the construction of railroads and mines, and farmed the land. Further, U.S. capital 
expanded into the local economies, which included sugar plantations, mines, cattle 
ranches, coffee estates, and commercial organizations. U.S. citizens began establishing 
trading companies and boarding houses to increase profits. U.S. citizens with specialized 
skills began flocking to the budding island, moneylenders, shippers, engineers, and 
machinists arrived to operate and service the industrial equipment that was now being 
imported regularly from the United States. The modern steam-powered mill machinery, 
steamboats, and railroads increased productivity and profits, further reinforcingt the U.S. 
control over Cuban resources. 
 The strengthening of the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba linked the Cuban 
company closely with the U.S.’s. The economic crisis during the 1880’s both exemplified 
and  reinforced this linkage; as the world price of sugar sharply declined with the price of 
new competitors, the Cubans began seeking a secure place in the U.S. markets on as 
favorable terms as possible.123 
122 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 40. 
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 The growth of the beet sugar industry in France, Austria, and Germany during the 
1870s and 80s displaced the primary Cuban export from the European markets. In 1854, 
beet sugar accounted for only 14 percent of the total world production of sugar; however, 
by 1884 it grown to 53 percent of the international supply.124 This left the U.S., by 
proximity and demand, as the only market with the capacity to absorb the now excess 
Cuban production.  
 During these years, the Cuban economy changed structurally due to the U.S. 
connection. Cuban production strategies, consumption patterns, and political alignments 
evolved to reflect the commercial ties with the U.S. The reorientation of trade away from 
Spain, and towards the U.S., exposed some of the contradictions in colonialism and 
confirmed that Cuban expansion could no longer be contained within the Spanish 
colonial structure. Though the Spanish government strained to accommodate the 
transformations that were taking place in Cuba, it became increasingly apparent that it 
was incapable of coping with the situation. Spain could not provide the capital, financing, 
shipping, and technology to continue Cuba’s growing trade and production. 
 The implications of Spain’s inability to provide were not ambiguous; the Spanish 
involvement in the Cuban economy was quickly diminishing due to the lack of material 
resources and technical knowledge that was required to continue driving the Cuban 
economy. Cuban economic growth had been swift, in some regions spectacular, and the 
production techniques and industrial innovations imported from the U.S. had transformed 
key sectors of the Cuban economy.125 
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  Meanwhile, the U.S. investors continued to expand throughout the different areas 
of the Cuban economy. The major Cuban cities had U.S. companies operating utilities 
services. The U.S. companies control over the mineral resources of the Cubans also 
expanded. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation out of Pennsylvania created the Juraguá Iron 
Company Ltd. and the Ponupo Manganese Company, in Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish 
American Iron Company (Pennsylvania Steel Company) managed manganese and nickel 
mines throughout the island. The Sigua Iron Company seized control of the mining 
industry near El Caney. In 1892 alone, more than $875,000 of iron ore was shipped to 
U.S. cities from the port of Santiago de Cuba.126 
 The U.S. takeover of Cuban utilities and industries was both a product and a 
foreshadowing of evolving colonial relationships. In ten years, the Cuban economy, 
revitalized with U.S. capital and dependent upon U.S. imports, had completely 
restructured itself around the U.S. economy. In the early 1880s, 94 percent of Cuba’s 
total sugar production was exported directly to the United States. By the 1890s, U.S. 
companies investment in Cuba was tallied at around $50 million (roughly $1.3 billion in 
today’s dollars), but in fact could have been much higher.127 U.S. Consul Ramón noted in 
1882 that: 
De facto, Cuba is already inside the commercial union of the United States…The 
Island is now entirely dependent upon the market of the United States, in which to 
sell its sugar cane products; also the existence of the sugar plantations, the 
railroads used in transporting the products of the plantations in the shipping ports 
of the island, the export and import trades of Cuba based thereon, each including 
126 Ibid., 41. 
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 hundreds of minor industries, such as the agricultural and mechanical trades, store 
houses, wharves, lighters, stevedores, brokers, clerks and bankers, real estate 
owners, and shopkeepers of all kinds, and holders of the public debt, are now all 
directly related to the market of the United States to the extent of 94 percent of 
their employment.128 
 The increasing reliance on U.S. markets in Cuban had two immediate 
consequences. The Cuban local governments demanded a higher level of autonomy and 
control over trade and commerce regulations. Second, Madrid was further pressured to 
negotiate a trade deal with the U.S. that provided favorable terms for the Cuban 
producers and consumers. 
 In 1891, Madrid gave in; the Foster-Cánovas agreement was signed by both 
countries, giving Cuba preferential access to U.S. markets in return for Spanish tariff 
concessions on U.S. imports. The effects of the agreement were dramatic; sugar 
production in Cuba expanded spectacularly from 632,000 tons in 1890, to 976,000 tons in 
1982, and reached a historic peak of one million tons in 1894.129  
 The 1891 agreement only further encouraged U.S. investment in Cuban sugar 
production companies. In 1892, the American Refining Company acquired the Trinidad 
Sugar Company. In 1893, a conglomerate of New York sugar merchants created the 
Tuinucú Cane Sugar Company and established sugar operations in Sancti-Spíritus in 
central Colombia. A collection of New Jersey investors acquired control of the 3,000-acre 
Mapos estate in Sancti-Spíritus as well. By far the largest acquisition in land during this 
128 Ramon O. Williams, “Sugar Interests of Cuba” Reports from the Consuls of the United States. 
Washington D.C.: G.P.O., 1888. 659. 
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 period occurred in 1893, when a New York firm, headed by Benjamin Perkins and 
Osgood Walsh, obtained control of the Constancia estate in Cienfuegos. The 60,000-acre 
plantation was the largest single sugar property in the world. 130 
 The increases in reciprocal trade following the 1891 agreement went far beyond 
sugar. In 1893, Cuban imports from the United States reached nearly half of the total U.S. 
exports to Central and Latin America ($24 million out of $62 million). Cuban exports to 
the U.S. increased 46% from $54 million in 1890 to $79 million in 1893, twelve times 
larger than Cuban exports to Spain. Spain accounted for a relatively inconsequential $10 
million of Cuban imports and provided the island with only $34 million of its import.131 
The Second War for Independence 
 By the 1890s, the discontent with colonialism had progressed into a dispute as 
much between Cubans as between Cubans and Spaniards. The lack of fairness or justice 
had a peculiar local quality. The oppression in Cuba was more internal than external, 
social inequality was the premise around which armed separatists rallied. Cubans had, 
and continued to, advocate for independence, but now they also spoke of war as a 
technique for redemption and social change. A new constituency formed around the idea 
of Cuba Libre, or free Cuba; the politically displaced, the socially deprived, and the 
economically desperate, for whom armed struggle appeared to be the only way to address 
grievances against the colonial regime and the local aristocracy. To this constituency, 
there were two prime obstacles blocked the way to independence: peninsulares¸ the 
aristocracy of the island, and the planters. 
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  However, there was in fact in fact a third obstacle: the United States. So intensely 
did the Cuba Libre challenge the colonial system and so stubbornly did it declare the 
primacy of Cuban interests that it placed the separatists onto a collision course with the 
U.S. The independentista concept or plan was simple: Cuba was for Cubans, but nearly a 
century of U.S. policy had been dedicated to preventing just that. In essence, Cuba Libre, 
as it existed in the 1890s, would not be able to proceed without deeply effecting Cuba’s 
political relations with Spain, class relations on the island, and the major economic 
relationship with the U.S. So intertwined were these three relationships that one could not 
be changed without deeply effecting the other two. Throwing off the colonial regime 
would result in nothing less than the complete overthrow of the structures that had 
supported the peninuslares rule, maintained the privilege and property of the creole elites, 
and allowed U.S. interests to participating in the local economy.  
 Political discontent was not the only aspect of colonial disaffection. In 1894, the 
U.S. passed Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, which rescinded U.S. tariff concessions on 
Cuban exports and imposed a new 40 percent ad valorem duty on all sugar entering the 
U.S. This effectively dismantled the foundation of the earlier Foster-Cánovas reciprocal 
trade agreement between Washington and Madrid. The Spanish government responded 
quickly by canceling duty concessions on U.S. imports. An all-out trade war seemed to 
be brewing between the two nations.  
 The sudden disentanglement of Cuba from its most prosperous trading market in 
the U.S. had severe consequences. Cuba lost its preferential access to the only market in 
the region with the capacity and demand to absorb the growing sugar production and 
thereby isolate it from the uncertainties of the world markets. Spanish retaliatory tariffs 
48 
 
 had then raised the possibility that the U.S. would respond by banning Cuban sugar 
altogether.  
 The effect on the Cuban economy was immediate and profound, profits and 
production plummeted. Sugar exports that had grown from $64 million in 1893, steadily 
plummeted to $45 million in 1895, and then to $13 million a year later. Two years after 
the record one million ton sugar harvest in 1894, the sugar harvest was 225,000 tons.132 
Sugar producers not only faced a decline in profits and production, but also faced with 
the prospect of losing preferential access to the machines, equipment, and spare parts that 
had revolutionized the sugar industry during the midcentury. In Santiago de Cuba, new 
duties on material from the U.S. after 1894 drastically raised prices on all imports (table 
1). Further, the loss of access to preferential U.S. markets also coincided with a drop in 
global sugar prices. As a result, the price of sugar fell to below two cents a pound for the 
first time in Cuban sugar production history. 
Table 1. Select Trade Prices, 1891-1894133 
Material 
1891-
1893 1894 
Iron Bridge Material Free $48.00 per ton 
Iron or Steel Rails Free $10.00 per ton 
Iron or Steel Tools Free $25.00 per ton 
Machinery Free $15.00-$60.00 per ton 
  
132 Ibid., 43. 
133 Pulaski F. Hayatt to Secretary of State, 12 October 1984, Despatches[sic] from United States Consuls in 
Santiago De Cuba, 1799-1906. Washington: National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, 
General Services Administration, 1959. 
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 The impact of the 1894 crisis reached far beyond the sugar system, no facet of 
Cuban society was insulated from it. Many of the merchants, traders, and retailers who 
had replaced their traditional commercial ties with Spanish suppliers with U.S. suppliers 
were now faced with ruin. Unemployment skyrocketed, the price of commodity goods 
increased, and prices soared. Particularly alarming was the exponential increase in 
foodstuffs; the government duties were passed directly onto consumers, causing prices 
skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. The Spanish government’s restoration of colonial 
customs duties meant that the island would pay exponentially higher prices for staple 
food imports (table 2). As costs for basic goods increased, discretionary spending was 
sharply curtailed, decreasing the availability of higher-priced goods. This led to a drop in 
U.S. shipping; by October 1894, half of the U.S. steamers that had been traveling to 
Santiago de Cuba no longer serviced the port.134 
 
Select Foodstuff Prices per 100 kilos, 1893-1895135 
Foodstuff 1891-1893 1894 Percent Change 
Wheat $0.30  $3.95  1217% 
Flour $1.00  $4.75  375% 
Corn $0.25  $3.95  1480% 
Meal $0.25  $4.75  1800% 
  
134 Ibid. 
135 Ramon O. Williams to Edwin F. Uhl, 5 January 1895, Despatches[sic] from United States Consuls in 
Santiago De Cuba, 1799-1906. Washington: National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, 
General Services Administration, 1959. 
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 The islander’s sense of economic deprivation served to highlight the growing 
recognition of their own political powerlessness. As Cuban producers and consumer’s 
dependence on U.S. markets grew, they became more and more affected by the 
unexpected fluctuation in this market. The economic safety of Cuba became more and 
more dependent on forces over which nobody on the island had significant control. 
Throughout the economic turmoil of the 1890s, Cubans found themselves reduced to 
passive onlookers in economic drama involving the total meltdown of the Cuban 
economy, powerless to control the forces that governed their lives.    
 There was a mounting sense of acquaintance with such powerlessness, and the 
Cubans began to grow weary of it. La Lucha of Havana lamented that, “Here we are tired 
of protesting against exorbitant levies used to keep Yankee goods out of Cuba. In vain, 
too, have been our efforts against the imposition of prohibitive duties on American 
goods. We have not been heard in Madrid; because we are miserable and long suffering 
colonists, our clamors are undeserving of the attention of those who govern and 
misgovern.”136 
Questions of Cuba's status and the nature and necessity of its relationship with 
Spain came to the forefront of political debate and discussion on the island. A looming 
sense of uncertainty and uneasiness permeated throughout the island. In late 1894, the 
U.S. Consul in Santiago de Cuba reported that, “the residents and commercial interests 
here are protesting loud and strong against being thus summarily cut off from their 
natural commercial allies, and this action on the part of the home government adds 
136 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 45. 
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 greatly to the feeling of unrest that pervades all classes.137 The prosperity that the Cubans 
had seen for nearly half a century was precipitated by the expansion of trade, which had 
required the reduction of Spanish control. The success from the close economic ties to the 
United States made the prospect of returning to a regimen of strict Spanish exclusivity as 
inadmissible as it was inconceivable.  
 The separatist war, the "Grito de Baire," began in late February 1895, in the same 
manner that the revolts prior to it had: localized skirmishes broke out in the remote 
eastern mountains of Cuba, an area that appeared to be too distant to cause planters and 
politicians in eastern Cuba to worry. Nevertheless, by the summer the once local revolt 
had grew to a matter of national importance. The insurgent armies had marched out of the 
eastern mountains and down into the rich cattle-grazing estates of Camagüey in the 
summer, through the fertile sugar plantations of Matanzas and Havana in the Autumn, 
and deep into the lucrative tobacco fields of Pinar del Río by the onset of winter. In less 
than a year, the revolt had reached areas of Cuba that had never before been touched by 
the armed stirrings of nationality.138 
The creole elite in Cuba held no delusions of safety after 1896. For decades the 
local property owners had clung to the Spanish colonial regime protection, but by the 
final years of the nineteenth century, Spain was practically defaulting on its raison d'être 
for still being in Cuba. The struggling colonial bourgeoisie contemplated their imminent 
destruction with deepening depression. Certain that the Spanish sovereignty over Cuba 
was doomed to fail, they were now ready to sacrifice the colonial relationship for any 
137 Pulaski F. Hayatt to Secretary of State, 12 October 1984, Despatches/ Santiago De Cuba, 1799-1906. 
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 source of protection and patronage. The bourgeoisie was now faced with what they had 
feared the most throughout the nineteenth century: a successful populist uprising and they 
needed help quickly. 
U.S. intervention, many Cubans concluded, was the only hope of ending the 
insurrection and restoring the beleaguered social order. In June 1896, close to a hundred 
prominent planters, lawyers, merchants, and manufactures petitioned President Grover 
Cleveland to intervene in the conflict. "We cannot," the petitioners pleaded, "express our 
opinion openly and formally, for he who should dare, whilst living in Cuba, to protest 
against Spain, would, undoubtedly, be made a victim, both in his person and his property, 
to the most ferocious persecution at the hands of the government." The petitioners then 
explained that Spain had nothing further to offer Cuba, save economic destruction and 
ruin. The property owners did not find solace in the idea of independence either; they 
believed that if the Spanish rule threatened havoc, independence would lead to complete 
chaos.  
With confidence in Spain nonexistent, and uncertain of their future under Cuban 
rule, property owners asked Washington to intercede in the conflict: "We would ask that 
the party responsible to us should be the United States. In them we have confidence, and 
in them only."139 “The worst thing that could happen to Cuba,” bemoaned one planter, 
“would be independence,” adding that Cubans, “cannot bring a firm and stable 
government to the island.”140 In early 1879, a U.S. correspondent in Havana noted that 
planters, merchants, and businesspersons had concluded that Cuba was lost to Spain and 
139 Ibid., 46. 
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 hoped for U.S. intervention, and eventual annexation.141 Later in the year, William H. 
Calhoun, a special agent deployed to Cuba at the behest of the State department, reported 
on the local conditions, “Cuban planters and Spanish property holders are now satisfied 
that the island must soon slip from Spain’s grasp, and would welcome immediate 
American intervention.”142  
From the outset of the uprising, President Cleveland’s administration had upheld 
the longstanding U.S. policy approaches to Cuba: oppose Cuban independence and 
support Spanish sovereignty. The reasoning behind the policy remained the same; Cuban 
independence could lead to political instability, social clashes, and economic anarchy. 
Further, the large number of people of color participating in the insurrection in positions 
of prominence, and in possession of arms added onto the U.S. apprehension. Secretary of 
State Richard B. Olney articulated that even the "most devoted friend of Cuba," and the 
"most enthusiastic advocate for popular government," could not look at the turmoil in 
Cuba "except with the gravest apprehension." Secretary Olney further reasoned that:  
There are only too strong reasons to fear that, once Spain were withdrawn from 
the island, the sole bond of union between the different factions of the insurgents 
would disappear; that a war of races would be precipitated, all the more 
sanguinary for the discipline and experience acquired during the insurrection, and 
that, even if there were to be a temporary peace, it could only be through the  
establishment of a white and black republic, which, even if agreeing at the outset 
upon a division of the island between them, would be enemies from the start, and 
141 New York World, 22 March 1897. 1. 
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 would never rest until the one had been completely vanquished or subdued by the 
other.143 
The United States once again stood by and supported Spanish efforts to maintain 
sovereignty over the islands. In 1895, President Cleveland demanded adherence to the 
U.S. neutrality laws and vigorously enforced them. Washington coordinated with Spain 
to prevent Cuban filibustering expeditions from forming and departing from the U.S. 
Between 1895 and 1896, the U.S. government intercepted more than half of the Cuban 
filibustering expeditions in the U.S. and proceeded to prosecute the offenders. Overall, 
about seventy expeditions tried to organize in the U.S. throughout the war, but only a 
third would reach the island.144 
Despite the outward support for the Spanish, the U.S. had concluded that they 
were doomed to failure. Secretary Olney wrote in September of 1895, “While the 
insurrectionary forces to be dealt with are more formidable than ever before, the ability of 
Spain to cope with them has visibly and greatly decreased. She is straining every nerve to 
stamp out the insurrection within the next few months. For whatever obvious reason, 
because she is almost at the end of her resources.” Finally concluding: “Spain cannot 
possibly succeed.”145 
As Spain tried, and failed to, subdue the insurrection running rampant in Cuba, 
the Cleveland administration became convinced that only sweeping reforms in Cuba, 
including autonomy, could actually bring the rebellion to end while preserving some 
143 Richard B. Olney to Enrique Dupuy de Lome, 4 April 1896, Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and 
Documents 1896-1900. Washington: G.P.O., 1905. 6-7. 
144 Lyman J. Gage. "Work of the Treasury Department," In The American-Spanish War: A History by the 
War Leaders. Norwich, Connecticut: C.C. Haskell, 1899. 367-91; John E. Wilkie. “The Secret Service in the 
War.” In The American-Spanish War: A History by the War Leaders. 425-436. 
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 semblance of Spanish sovereignty. A political solution would be required to preserve 
even a modified colonial status quo. The U.S. support of Spanish efforts was rooted in the 
belief that Spain would eventually establish its authority over its rebelling colony, if not 
through immediate military action, then eventually through political concessions. 
Reconciliatory Efforts 
The passing of a year would change everything though. In 1897, President 
William McKinley was elected leader of the U.S., and his Republican administration 
pursued colonial reforms with new vigor. The new Liberal ministry in Madrid under 
Praxedes Mateo Sagasta also ceased to oppose reforms. The Cuban insurrection has 
devolved into a war of attrition, one that Spain could not possibly hope to win. The 
Spanish army was constantly on the defensive, walled off in the major cities, while the 
Cuban army roamed the countryside on the offensive. Because of the war, the economies 
of both Spain and Cuba were on the brink of collapse.   
In the autumn of 1897, due to U.S. pressure and deteriorating conditions, the 
Spanish Liberal ministry enacted a series of far reaching reforms. In October, Madrid 
appointed moderate general Ramòm Blanco as the governor of the island. Amnesty was 
issued to all rebels and political prisoners were released. In December, the Spanish 
announced a new constitution, which featured an autonomous, and installed a liberal 
creole government on January 1, 1898.  
These colonial reforms had the opposite effect, dooming Spanish control over 
Cuba. For those who defended Spanish rule over Cuba the liberal reforms were 
tantamount to treason. The loyalists denounced the autonomous creole government, 
reasoning that it would leave the island open up to further subversion; the radicals in the 
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 government would overrun the moderates, revolution would outpace reform, and 
autonomy would lead to independence. U.S. Consul Fitzhugh Lee reported in 1897 that, 
“All classes of the Spanish citizens are violently opposed to real or genuine autonomy 
because it would throw the control of the island into the hands of the Cubans and rather 
than that, they would prefer annexation to the United States or some form of an American 
protectorate.”146  
By giving in to a liberal government, the Spanish had convinced the loyalists, 
peninsulares, and creoles that it had lost the will to defend its sovereignty over Cuba. 
Many postulated that the granting of autonomy was evidence that Spain was organizing 
to abandon the colony. The most astute among the peninsulares and creoles understood 
that the new Cuban government lacked the ability to wage war and the authority to make 
peace. The establishment of a government consisting of creole moderates dealt the final 
blows to conservative resolve in Cuba. Developments during late 1897 and early 1898 
weakened the determination of the only forces in Cuba who, besides the insurgents, 
retained the loyalty and will to win.    
The new Cuban government was vigorously denounced by mass meetings and 
rallies held across the island, swelling the number of appeals for U.S. intervention. In 
November 1897, the U.S. vice consul in Matanzas conveyed that, “nearly all Spaniards, 
businessmen, and property holders in this province wish and pray for annexation to the 
United States.”147 Fitzhugh Lee’s reports from Havana in November 1897 corroborated 
this sentiment, “A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commercial or 
business interests and own property here will not accept Autonomy, but prefer annexation 
146 Fitzhugh Lee to William R. Day, 17 November 1897, Despatches/Havana. 
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 to the United States, rather than an independent republic or genuine autonomy under the 
Spanish flag.”148   
Before the end of the year, the sentiment for U.S. intervention had become public 
in both countries. In December 1897, a statement was printed in Havana and signed by 
business people and property owners that claimed to represent 80 percent of the island’s 
wealth denouncing the autonomist regime.149 At the same time, a meeting of property 
owners in Cienfuegos penned a resolution urging President McKinley to establish a 
protectorate over Cuba. In February 1989, the most powerful peninsulares created a 
formal commission to secure U.S. assistance. “The mother country cannot protect us,” 
they insisted, “Blanco will not protect us. If left to the insurgents our property is lost. 
Therefore, we want the United States to save us.”150 
The same reforms that were too much for the loyalists proved to be too little for 
the separatists. The insurgents denounced the autonomy and rejected accommodating 
Spain on anything other than complete independence. General Máximo Gómez vowed, 
“It is the firm resolution of the army and people of Cuba who have shed so much blood in 
order to conquer their independence, not to falter in their just cause until triumph or death 
crowns their efforts.”151 General Gómez reiterated the Cuban position two weeks later: 
“We no longer ask concessions… Even were Spain’s proposals bona fide, nothing could 
tempt us to treat with her. We are for liberty, not for Spanish reforms.”152  
148 Fitzhugh Lee to William R. Day, 23 November 1897, Despatches/Havana. 
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 Rather than conciliating Cubans, the Spanish reforms actually made them more 
obstinate, and separatist morale soared. Provisional President Bartolomè Masò proudly 
proclaimed, “Spain’s offers of autonomy is a sign of her weakening.”153 General Calixto 
Garcìa agreed: “I regard autonomy only as a sign of Spain’s weakening power and an 
indication that the end is not far off.”154 
The reforms had failed; Spain had made the ultimate concession as a last resort to 
maintain its colonial empire, but its sovereignty over Cuba was ending. The realization 
lifted separatist morale to an all-time high, never before had it been clearer that they 
would triumph. Preparations for the last desperate battles around Spanish strongholds 
began to take place. In the east end of the island, General Calixto Garcìa laid siege to 
Santiago de Cuba, and in the west, the insurgents began to surround the larger provincial 
inland cities. General Máximo Gómez seemed as confident as ever when he discussed the 
preparations for the final assaults against Spanish strongholds; with “cannons and a great 
deal of dynamite,” Gómez projected that “we can expel them by fire and steel from the 
towns.”155 
The United States also recognized that the failed reforms doomed any hope that 
Madrid would be able to salvage any semblance of control over Cuba. Secretary of State 
John Sherman lamented ruefully, “Spain will lose Cuba. That seems to be certain. She 
cannot continue the struggle.”156 Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day publicly 
agreed, "The Spanish government seems unable to conquer the insurgents." In a private 
memorandum, Day went even further:  
153 New York Journal, 24 February 1898. 1. 
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 Today the strength of the Cubans [is] nearly double... and [they] occupy and 
control virtually all the territory outside the heavily garrisoned coast cities and a 
few interior towns. There are no active operations by the Spaniards...The eastern 
provinces are admittedly "Free Cuba." In view of these statements alone, it is now 
evident that Spain's struggle in Cuba has become absolutely hopeless... Spain is 
exhausted financially and physically, while the Cubans are stronger.157 
 With the receding tide of Spanish sovereignty, Washington was now faced with a 
Cuba which bad been an anathema to U.S. policymakers since President Jefferson: a 
strong possibility of Cuban independence. The realities of the “no transfer” policy were 
now carried to their ugly conclusions. The United States could not permit Spain to 
transfer Cuba to another power, and it would not permit Spain to now cede sovereignty of 
the island to the Cubans.  
 U.S. diplomacy took on a new sense of interventionism, increasing the pressure 
on Spain. On 27 March, Washington delivered a three-part ultimatum to Madrid; an 
armistice must be instated until October 5, a halting of resettlement programs with 
permission to distribute U.S. relief supplies, and the utilization of President McKinley as 
a mediator to negotiate the end of the rebellion. In return, the U.S. promised that it would 
use “friendly offices to insurgents to accept the plan.”158 
 After ten days of frantic negotiation and avoidance, Spain capitulated. On April 5, 
the Queen Regent proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire in Cuba, effective immediately and 
lasting until September. Five days later, Washington received Spain's formal acceptance 
157 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 49. 
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 of the provisions of McKinley's 27 March ultimatum. On the same day in Havana, 
Governor General Blanco ordered all Spanish forces to cease operations.159 
McKinley had scored a major victory save for one important fact; he had failed to 
make good on the U.S. part of the 27 March ultimatum: to use his “friendly offices to get 
the insurgents to accept the plan.” The collapse of the U.S. proposal was not due to 
Spanish equivocation, but to the U.S. inability to obtain Cuban agreement to the cease-
fire. The Cuban insurgent leaders would in no way agree to a cease-fire, they argued that 
it would have calamitous consequences on the Cuban war effort, only benefitting Spain. 
The insurgent leaders ordered their forces to continue operations; General Calixto Garcìa 
encouraged his troops, “They have to be hit hard and at the head, day and night. In order 
to suspend hostilities, an agreement is necessary with our Government and this will have 
to be based on independence.” General Máximo Gómez declared, “More than ever, the 
war must continue in full force.”160 
The Cuban denunciation of the Spanish cease-fire ended all U.S. hopes that the 
summer campaign of 1898 could be averted. Spain had only one condition to its 
agreement: that the Cubans observe the ceasefire. With the Cuban refusal, Spain had no 
choice but to recommence full field operations and march to an inevitable military defeat. 
The tables had been turned; no longer were the U.S. or Spain determining the fate of the 
island, the Cubans now firmly held the reigns. Once Spain refused to transfer Cuba to the 
United States, and the Cubans rejected Spanish sovereignty in any form, the U.S. 
politicians were faced with two prospects: independence or intervention. 
159 Ramòn Blanco, “Suspension of Hostilities,” 10 April 1898. FRUS (1898). 750. 
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 American Intervention 
 
Cuban independence was not just a threat to the propriety of colonial rule or the 
property relations in the regime; it directly challenged the expectation of colonial 
succession. By ending Spanish sovereignty in 1898, the Cubans also endangered the U.S. 
claim to sovereignty. The U.S. viewed the transfer of Cuba into its hands as the next 
natural act of colonial continuity. The Cuban rebellions success put all of this into 
jeopardy. The U.S. was as frustrated with the Spanish inability to maintain control over 
the island as it was alarmed at the prospect of a Cuban victory. Neither repression nor 
concession were successful, causing Spanish sovereignty to quickly slip beyond recovery. 
If Washington did not act decisively, that sovereignty would also be lost to the U.S.    
As a result, President William McKinley asked congress in April 1898 to 
authorize military intervention in Cuba: to declare war against Spain, and by 
consequence, the Cubans as well. President McKinley’s war address provided few 
references of concrete foreign policy; it contained no mention of Cuban independence, no 
recognition of the Cuban provisional government, no sympathy for Cuba Libre, and did 
not even make a mention of territorial expansion. The purpose for U.S. forces in Cuba, 
McKinley emphasized, was the “forcible intervention…as a neutral to stop the war. The 
forcible intervention of the United States…involves…hostile constraint upon both the 
parties to the contest.”161 The U.S. planned to neutralize both the Spaniards and the 
Cubans, thereby establishing its own superiority over the island. McKinley administration 
opponents in Congress made efforts to officially recognize the provisional Cuban 
republic, and by mid-April, McKinley was forced to yield to the compromise. Article IV 
161 William McKinley, "War Message." United States Congress. 1898. Speech. 
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 of the congressional resolution, the Teller Amendment, stated that the United States, 
“hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, 
when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its 
people.”162 
Independence in Name Only 
U.S. intervention in 1898 would radically alter the situation in Cuba: the Cuban 
war for independence was now a U.S. war of conquest. The Cuban revolt had been 
transformed into the “Spanish-American War,” nomenclature that was meant to ignore 
Cuban participation in the war and revealed the next series of changes. The U.S. forces 
would not land on the island as allies of the Cuban people or arbiters of their 
independence; they were going to war, as they always said they would, to prevent the 
transfer of Cuban sovereignty to a third party. 
The exclusion of the Cuban people began almost as soon as the U.S. troops 
arrived. The U.S. commanders retrograded insurgent forces behind U.S. troops in order to 
serve in a support role, Cuban commander’s advice and opinions were ignored, and the 
negotiations for the surrender of Santiago de Cuba in July were conducted without any 
Cuban representation, with Cubans being prohibited to enter the city as part of the 
surrender agreement. General Calixto Garcìa was floored by the audacity of the 
Americans and asked U.S. Army Major General William R. Shafter to clarify the terms 
of the agreement. General Shafter informed General Garcìa that Santiago de Cuba was 
now considered part of the territory conquered by the United States and “part of the 
162 Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 51. 
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 Union.”163 This was in spite of all the insurgent preparations and campaigns that had led 
up to the surrender. General Shafter publicly announced that the reason that Cubans were 
denied access was to the city was based on the fear that the insurgents would be unable to 
restrain themselves from attacking Spanish soldiers, abusing women, and plundering the 
city.164  
Resentment and anger swept through the Cuban camps, General Garcìa 
condemned the notion that Santiago de Cuba was “part of the union:” “I will never accept 
that our country be considered conquered territory.”165 General Garcìa was incensed that 
his Cuban soldiers had been labeled as unable to control themselves from raping and 
killing, stating to General Shafter: “Allow me to protest against even a shadow of such an 
idea, we are not savages who ignore the principles of civilized warfare. We respect too 
much our cause to stain it with barbarity and cowardice.”166  
These issues revealed the fundamentally different situations that the U.S. and 
Cubans found themselves in 1898. By the end of the war the disconnect was widespread; 
insurgent commanders became non-cooperative and hostile, withdrawing from joint 
operations and breaking off contact with U.S. forces. General Garcìa turned in his 
resignation declaring that he could “no longer [be] disposed to continue obeying the 
orders and cooperating with the plans of the American Army.” He warned his fellow 
Cubans to avoid ceding any power to the “army of intervention.”167 
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 The surrender negotiations of Santiago de Cuba in July were not the only 
negotiations conducted without Cuban participation. Both the peace protocol in August 
and the peace treaty conclusion in the autumn in Paris were held purely without Cuban 
influence. The Treaty of Paris formally passed sovereignty over to the U.S., beginning a 
three-year military occupation of the island. During these three years, an economic 
revival and reconstruction took place; as production and employment increased, the 
dilapidated Cuban economy began to emerge from its war paralysis. The U.S. brought 
sanitary programs to improve the living conditions, public-works programs to build 
highways, and transportation initiatives to stimulate Cuban revival.168 
The U.S. occupation of the island also determined the manner of Cuba's future 
relations with the U.S. In January 1901, Secretary of State Elihu Root discussed four 
provisions that he deemed essential to U.S. interests: first, "in transferring the control of 
Cuba to the Government established under the new constitution the United States 
reserved and retains the right to intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence 
and the maintenance of a stable Government adequately protecting life, property and 
individual liberty.” Second, “No government organized under the constitution shall be 
deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement with any foreign power 
which may tend to impair or interfere with the independence of Cuba.” Secretary Root 
also asserted that to perform “such duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing 
provisions and for her own defense” the U.S. “may acquire and hold the title to land, and 
maintain naval stations at certified points.” Finally, Secretary Root concluded that, “all 
168 Ibid., 52. 
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 the acts of the Military Government, and all rights acquired thereunder, shall be valid and 
maintained and protected.”169 
These were the crucial features of the Platt Amendment, which was enacted into 
law the by U.S. Congress in February 1901. Though not a perfect substitution for 
annexation, it devolved Cuban sovereignty into an extension of the U.S. national system. 
Cuba was restricted from conducting foreign relations, specifically treaty authority, debt 
restrictions, and cession territory in order to prevent Cuba from becoming internationally 
entangled.170 
News of the Platt Amendment caused widespread criticism and protests in Cuba. 
Anti-U.S. demonstrations took place across the island, with former insurgent military 
leaders menacingly alluding to the necessity of returning to the field of battle to defend 
their independista ideals. Veterans associations, city councils, and civic and community 
organizations cabled their outrage to U.S. authorities in Washington and Havana. The 
situation caused so much apprehension in the U.S. leadership that the Key West Naval 
Squadron was prompted to pay a courtesy call to the island.171 
In April 1901, Cuban apprehensions were temporarily appeased when a Cuban 
commission visited Washington and received personal assurances from President 
McKinley that the Platt Amendment would never be utilized to restrict in any way Cuban 
sovereignty. Though still bitterly divided the commission decided to accept the Platt 
Amendment. The Platt Amendment met all the original U.S. demands. It restored the 
longstanding U.S. commercial and security interests in the area with the Teller 
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 Amendment. The amendment served as a substitute for direct formal annexation, while 
transferring Cuban sovereignty into the U.S. national system, thereby preventing Cuban 
from being embroiled in international entanglements.  
Cuba had finally secured its independence, in a manner of speaking, or at least the 
appearance of independence. In actuality, Cuba obtained self-government without self-
determination, and independence without sovereignty. This was not what the Cuban 
rebels had set out to achieve when they launched a war in 1895, U.S. rule had merely 
been substituted for Spain’s. The vast destruction of property during the rebellion and the 
U.S. occupation had opened a new and decisive phase in the U.S. economic permeation 
of Cuba. The total level of urban indebtedness was estimated at $100 million, more than 
three-quarters of Cuba's declared property value of $139 million. The debt was not 
limited to the urban sphere; rural real estate was in $107 million in debt with a total 
property value of roughly $185 million.172  
U.S. investors and entrepreneurs flocked to the island after the war, searching for 
any nonoperational plantations, destroyed farmland, and abandoned agricultural estates to 
purchase and refurbish for profit. Opportunities abounded, one U.S. investor exclaimed, 
“Nowhere else in the world are there such chances for success for the man of moderate 
means, as well as for the capitalist, as Cuba offers today…I advise the capitalist to invest 
in Cuba, and seriously suggest to the young and ambitious man to go to Cuba and cast his 
fortune with those of the island.” Commercial and Financial World described Cuba as 
“simply a poor man’s paradise and a rich man’s mecca.”173 In 1898, two former U.S. 
consular agents reported that, “Land, at this writing, can be bought in unlimited quantities 
172 Ibid., 53. 
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 at from one-half to one-twentieth of its value before the insurrection. For the ordinarily 
prudent man with some capital, who is willing to work, the island has opportunities for 
success and wealth through safe and profitable investments, the equal of which can be 
found in no other state.”174 
Speculators looked upon Cuba in wonder of the possibilities: Cuba was the new 
frontier. The island was described as a “virgin land,” and a “new California.”175 Isaac 
Ford remarked that, “Americans…have on their southern seaboard another California.”176 
General Leonard Wood, military governor of Cuba, agreed, describing the island as "a 
brand new economy."177 The cheap land interested miners, farmers, and ranchers, the 
same kind of people that were enticed by the first frontier. The U.S. gradually accepted 
control as a substitute for possession, arranged it thus in the 1901 Cuban constitution, and 
later a formal treaty. Excited with the prospect of a new frontier, thousands of U.S. 
opportunists traveled to the tropics. Though consisting of a wide variety of citizens, most 
were farmers and colonists, enticed by the availability of land. They would end up 
cultivating citrus fruit plantations, pineapple farms, and vegetables to export back to the 
U.S. markets. The American influence was undeniable, as immigrants swelled, towns 
with peculiar names began sprouting up: McKinley, Ocean Beach, Riverside, Garden 
City, Palm City, Omaja, and Bartle.178 
Powerful capitalists and corporations also flocked to the island, displacing Cubans 
and acquiring tens of thousands of acres of Cuban plantations and farmlands that had 
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 fallen into disrepair or default. Control by U.S. companies over the sugar production on 
the island greatly expanded during the military occupation. In 1899, less than a year after 
the occupation began, R. B. Hawley formed the Cuban-American Sugar Company and 
acquired the 7,000-acre Tinguaro estate in Matanzas, the Mercidatas mill in Pinar del 
Río, and organized the Chaparra sugar mill on 70,000 acres of land acquired in Puerto 
Padre. A year later, a group of U.S. investors purchased the 80,000-acre Francisco estate 
in the Southern Camagüey province. The Nipe Bay Company, a subsidiary of the United 
Fruit Company, acquired 40,000 acres of land in Puerto Padre in 1901. The United Fruit 
Company would then purchase 200,000-acres near Banes. Ten years after the struggle for 
independence, the Cubans were not as free as they thought; U.S. corporations controlled 
almost the entire Oriente north coast, from Baracoa to Manatí.179 Nearly 500,000 acres 
were distributed among roughly 2,000 U.S. mining operations during the occupation as 
well.180 
During the occupation, U.S. investors also advanced into Cuba’s transportation 
systems. The Cuba Company constructed the Cuban railway across the islands, 
purchasing 50,000 acres of land, and the right of way for 350 miles of track in the 
process. The Santiago Railroad Company, the Cuba Railway, the Cuban Easter Railway, 
and the Guantánamo Railroad were all prominent rail lines owned by U.S. investors. The 
U.S. also dominated electric transportation; the Havana Electric Railway Company, a 
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 New Jersey corporation, gained control of the capital’s electric transportation systems, 
with the Havana Central linking the capital to Marianao and Mariel.181  
U.S. corporations also moved to take over the utilities on the Island. The Spanish 
American Light and Power Company of New York was responsible for providing gas to 
the principal Cuban cities. Havana Central and Havana Electric, both U.S. based 
corporations, controlled electricity. Contractors from the U.S. set up shop in Havana to 
compete for lucrative government contracts. The Havana Subway Company was granted 
monopoly rights to install underground cables and electrical wires. U.S. capital controlled 
the telephone industry and the water industry as well.182 
The government contractors, employing U.S. laborers, constructed the public 
buildings, roads, and bridges of the early republic. Engineering companies constructed 
the ports in major coastal cities such as Havana. The T.L. Huston Contracting Company 
acquired the contract to dredge the major ports and construct wharves in Havana and 
Cuba. The Huston Company also won the contract to build the highway connecting 
Havana to the Pinar del Río. A subsidiary of the contracting Company was granted the 
contract to construct the new Havana sewer systems.  The Snare and Triest Company of 
New York built steel bridges, drawbridges, and fixed bridges for railroads, lighthouse 
along the coast, and a power plant providing electricity to Havana. The Tropical 
Engineering and Construction Company won the government contract to construct the 
Havana water supply system and multiple power plants in Matanzas.183 
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 During the occupation, roughly three-quarters of the cattle ranches with an 
estimated value of $30 million fell into U.S. investor’s hands. Sisal farms were bought 
out by International Harvester, banana farms by United Fruit, Standard Fruit, and 
DeGeorgio Fruit. The Harris Brothers Company supplied the new government with 
stationery, officer supplies, and paper. The Havana Advertising Company held all the 
most lucrative advertising contracts and billboards.184 Though many of the companies 
operated under Cuban affiliated names, there was no doubt where the capital and 
direction flowed from. 
In 1903, Cuba and the U.S. negotiated three treaties that affirmed over fifty years 
of relations and ushered in a new era of relations. The Permanent Treaty of 1903 formally 
and permanently bound the Platt Amendment. The Amendment, which was originally 
just an appendix to the Cuban Constitution of 1901, was made legally binding under 
international law. The treaty assured that the U.S. would have an established presence in 
Cuban internal affairs, serving as the basis of relations between the two countries until 
1934.   
The U.S. and Cuba also signed a Reciprocity Treaty. This treaty invigorated 
economic ties by creating a tariff schedule that granted Cuban agricultural exports a 20 
percent reduction in duties. In return, Cuba granted the U.S. a 20 percent concession on 
most imports, with increases to 24, 30, and 40 percent in some specific categories. Most 
of the imports in the 20 percent category were previously heavily consumed on the 
island, and were not expected to affect trade. The higher percentage concessions were on 
goods that had European competition, pricing the European goods out of the market.  
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 The economic treaty accelerated the integration of the Cuban economy into the 
U.S.’s. With the elimination of the Spanish colonial trade restrictions, the Cuban 
economy was immediately opened up to unfettered U.S. investment. This discouraged 
Cuban economic diversification, and increased reliance on foreign goods, specifically 
foodstuffs. Preferential access to U.S. markets furthered Cuban dependency on sugar 
exports and increased the U.S. control over the industry. By 1902, U.S. entrepreneurs 
owned 55 of the 223 sugar mills, amounting to 40 percent of the islands sugar production. 
By the mid-1920s, U.S. corporations owned 41 of the 184 mills, and 63 percent of the 
total production.185 
Finally, the two countries signed a treaty that established a U.S. naval base at 
Guantánamo Bay. This treaty was part of the clause in the Platt Amendment where Cuba 
would lease the U.S. land in Bahía Honda and Guantánamo Bay. The U.S. would 
eventually exchange the leasing rights to Bahía Honda for enlarged territory in 
Guantánamo. 
The three treaties between the U.S. and Cuba in 1903 merged and strengthened 
the political, economic, and strategic position of the U.S. in Cuba and the Caribbean 
region. Prudent negotiations and military involvement had allowed the U.S., much like it 
had in Chile, to interject itself into Latin American politics and emerge stronger than 
before. Washington had effectively cut off points of entry and exit into the Caribbean. By 
1903, the Caribbean had become the American Mediterranean, with the U.S. holding the 
proverbial straits of Gibraltar in Florida and Cuba. 
 
185 U.S. Congress, Senate, Cuban Sugar Sales: Testimony Taken By Committee on Relations with Cuba. 57th 
Congress, 1st Session. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1902. 332, 339-41. 
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 The Roosevelt Corollary  
 By 1904, with the expulsion of the Spanish from Cuba, the annexation of Puerto 
Rico,  the binding of Cuba with the 1903 treaties, and the creation of a protectorate in 
Panama, the United States had clearly established it's hegemony in the Central America 
and the Caribbean. The next logical step was for the U.S. to assume the task of the 
preserving the stability in the region, as it had now become vital to American security. 
The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe doctrine would provide the vindication for the 
U.S. assuming the role as the international police officer. Though the Corollary was 
hardly in line with the principals of 1823, it was founded with important precursors in 
mind. President Polk's message on April 29, 1848, questioned the Yucatan's right to 
transfer its sovereignty to a European power, the McLane-Ocampo agreements in 1859 
permitted the U.S. to protect its citizens and their property in Mexico, and most recently 
the U.S. government takeover of Cuba. 
 However, in 1904, there was admittedly less precedent for intervention to end 
financial mayhem. Only once in the 19th century had the U.S. considered such action; on 
February 7, 1880, a delinquent Venezuela, fearing retaliatory action from France, 
proposed to deliver monthly revenues to Washington for distribution to foreign 
creditors.186 On July 23, 1881, Secretary Blaine warned the French that under certain 
conditions, the U.S. would be obliged to administer Venezuela’s customs house, but 
nothing ever came of the threat.  
It was the Venezuelan imbroglio during 1902-1903 that most shaped the 
Roosevelt Corollary. The reaction from within the U.S. to the Anglo-German blockade 
186 Richard William Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History. New York: Knopf, 1962. 
234. 
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 convinced President Roosevelt that European coercion of American republic’s debt 
should be prevented, but his sense of justice told him that the legitimate claims to the 
debt would have to be addressed. On February 22, 1904, a court in Hague decided that 
force was a legitimate method to guarantee repayment of debts. This persuaded President 
Roosevelt that the temptation to declare war and seize assets to repay debt was too great 
and must be done away with.187  
   Thus, on December 6, 1904, after a triumph in the polls President Roosevelt 
issued a message stating that the U.S. did not seek additional lands in the Americas. 
However, “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United 
States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
flagrant cases of wrongdoing and impotence, to the exercise of international police 
power."188 The U.S. would interject itself into disputes between European countries and 
Latin American Countries, enforcing the legitimate claims, rather than the Europeans 
pressing their claims directly.  
The Roosevelt Corollary, just like the Monroe Doctrine, was a profound statement 
by the executive branch. When President Roosevelt presented the Corollary in 1904, the 
legislature did not endorse it, just as it had not endorsed the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 
President Roosevelt did not meet opposition until he endeavored to translate the theory 
into reality. On January 20, 1905, Minister Thomas C. Dawson signed a protocol in Santa 
187 Ibid., 234. 
188 Theodore Roosevelt, "Theodore Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1904" 
Washington D.C. Speech. 
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 Domino providing a U.S. guarantee that the territorial integrity of the Dominican 
Republic would remain intact, and that the U.S. would control over Dominican customs 
houses, including payment of all Dominican debts from the revenues collected.189 When 
the U.S. Senate got wind of this agreement, it erupted in righteous indignation and 
injured pride. The Panama affair had already angered the Senate, and many members 
considered the agreement an abridgment of senatorial prerogatives.  
In order to assuage fears of presidential powers run amok, Minister Dawson was 
ordered to change the terms of the agreement. On February 7, 1905, the agreements 
guarantee of territorial integrity was altered to promise to respect it, with references to 
the Monroe Doctrine being inserted into the preamble of the agreement. The renovated 
agreement reached the Senate on February 15, but no vote was taken before the Senate 
adjourned for summer recess. President Roosevelt called the Senate back into session, but 
was unable to overcome opposition and secure the necessary two-thirds majority.190 
President Roosevelt would not give up on his corollary however. Convinced that 
he had correctly diagnosed the problems with the Dominican body politic, he was 
determined to solve the problem in a different way. If an executive agreement garnered 
too great an outcry and a treaty could not be passed, then he would initiate a customs 
control via the enforcement of a modus vivendi. President Roosevelt was successful, and 
on April 1, 1905, a temporary arrangement was established that included the major points 
of the failed treaty. 
By April 1905, the American hegemony in the Caribbean was an undeniable fact; 
Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone had been annexed, Guantánamo Bay was a permanent 
189 Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy. 235. 
190 Ibid., 236. 
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 American naval base, the authority to intervene in both Cuba and Panama was secured, 
and the administration of the Dominican customs houses was beginning. The U.S. 
acquired the jurisdiction to build, operate, and defend a canal that would soon connect the 
Pacific and Atlantic, increasing American power and security on the seas. The Monroe 
Doctrine had been greatly expanded and flaunted. The Europeans had been denied a 
casus belli on American republics via debts and the English were transferring the bulk of 
their navy from the Caribbean to the North Sea to counteract the German buildup.191 The 
United States military and economic supremacy in the Americas was undisputed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 Ibid., 236. 
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 The Good Neighbor Policy 
 In the thirty years after the Roosevelt Corollary, the U.S. had deeply involved 
itself in the economic and political life of the Latin American nations.  In the 1920s, the 
U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic and Haiti militarily, with Haiti-American officials 
regulating and directing the governments vital activities. American marines kept a 
minority government in power in Nicaragua, and in Cuba, a personal representative of the 
president was directing efforts to ease electoral disputes and manage an economic 
crisis.192 The goal of the U.S. military intervention was clear: protection the commercial 
interests of American businesses above all else. By the 1930s, the Latin Americans grew 
wary of constant threat of U.S. intervention and hostilities began to fester. 
 Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized this resentment as he ascended to the 
Presidency in 1933. In his March inaugural address FDR announced that:  "In the field of 
World policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the 
neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of 
others, the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his 
agreements in and with a World of neighbors."193 Roosevelt sought to repair the image of 
the U.S. by reigning in the blatant protectionism of U.S. foreign investment, and restore 
U.S.-Latin relations in order to focus on dealing with the Great Depression.  
 Roosevelt’s strategy centered around three main ideas: abandoning the constant 
military and economic intervention, reverting to just and objective foreign policy, 
ushering in a new era of Pan Americanism. However, the rhetoric would prove to be 
192 Dana Gardner Munro, "The Transition from Intervention to the Good Neighbor Policy." In The United 
States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 371. 
193 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1933. 
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 stronger than reality, and created an illusion of hemispheric unity more than anything 
else. For the U.S. psyche, the good neighbor policy served as a way to confess the sins of 
the pass, have them wiped away, and pretend that the growing power and history of U.S. 
intervention would be overlooked in Latin America.   
 The U.S., in actuality, had been modifying its Latin American policy and strategy 
prior to the election of FDR. The Herbert Hoover administration had withdrawn U.S. 
troops from Nicaragua in January 1933, and scheduled the withdrawal of forces from 
Haiti in 1934. Nonetheless, FDR was the main proponent and most outspoken supporter 
of the policy. FDR accelerated the timeline for military withdraw and negotiated a treaty 
with Cuba that repealed the Platt Amendment. However, the U.S. would still maintain its 
base in Guantánamo Bay. 
 To give his inaugural address some substance FDR pledge nonintervention at the 
inter-American conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933. In eyes of Latin 
Americans, the test of neighborliness would be the U.S. refraining from intervention, but 
it was considered quite a victory to get the U.S. signature on the clause that read: "No 
state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another."194 Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, however, was not so eager to give up this power, and signed a proviso 
stating that the U.S. would continue to reserve the right to intervene according to the 
principles of international law. Finally, in 1936, at the Buenos Aires conference, the U.S. 
signed on without reservation a promise to refrain from intervening "directly or indirectly 
194 Cordell Hull, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International 
Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3-26, 1933. Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1934. 
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 and for whatever reason, in the internal and external affairs of any other parties."195 
Although this did not create a united Western Hemisphere, the U.S. cooperation at least 
created a mood of hemispheric cooperation that the U.S. would ride into WWII.196 
 There was more to the Good Neighbor Policy than the U.S. altered the way it 
handled border disputes and peacekeeping procedures, its major impact was to propagate 
the myth of a hemisphere of equals, united with a common view of the world. Although 
the policy was a welcomed change, it would not erase the decades of military 
intervention and economic exploitation. The Good Neighbor Policy helped build the 
Western Hemisphere Idea, but the rhetoric alone would not sustain it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 Cordell Hull, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference 
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 Colombian Counter-Insurgency 
 The most recent significant shift in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America occurred 
after terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in 2001. This pivot is best explained 
through a careful examination of U.S. involvement in Colombia in the post 9/11 period. 
However, to understand the significance of this pivot it is important to be familiar with 
the 20th century Colombian history and its relations with the U.S. 
La Violencia: Setting the Stage for U.S. Intervention 
 
 Since the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the Conservative and Liberal parties 
had dominated Colombian politics. Historically, the Conservative Party had represented 
the large landholding oligarchy and the Catholic Church, while the Liberal Party had 
aligned with the commercial sector and viewed the church as a “backwards social 
institution that prevented economic modernization.”197 Though their specific policy 
agendas had aligned for a number a years, the rise of Jorge Gaitán in the Liberal party 
during the 1940s reoriented the party with its left wing base. Gaitán brought an 
egalitarian agenda to the table, advocating for progressive reform to the labor laws and 
land laws.198 Gaitán’s popularity was established through his appeals to the poor and 
dispossessed in Colombia. Gaitán tried to make “capitalism socially responsible, not 
abolish it.”199  
 Gaitán took the reins of the Liberal Party in 1947, and was a heavy favorite to win 
the 1950 presidential elections. However, Gaitán’s populist popularity, criticism of 
197 Doug Stokes, America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London: Zed Books, 2004. 67. 
198 Ibid., 67. 
199 Jenny Pearce, Colombia, inside the Labyrinth. London: Latin America Bureau (Research and Action), 
1990. 45. 
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 unequal distribution of goods and services, made Colombia’s ruling class, largely aligned 
with the Conservative Party, increasingly worried and aggressive. In 1984 in Colombia’s 
capital, Bogotá, Gaitán was assassinated. His death ended the populist challenge of the 
oligarchic authority that griped Colombia, and dashed the hopes of the poor majority who 
he had championed. His death “ruptured the breakwaters holding back years of 
discontent,” and was followed by riots and an uprising in Bogatá that would destroy 
traditional symbols of oligarchic power and privilege.200 The Colombian military quickly 
put down the uprising, but the spark had lit a great fire in the hearts of the Colombian 
people, and a large-scale civil war know as la violencia erupted.  
The U.S. interpreted the instability caused by the assassination and the subsequent 
civil war as dangerously threatening U.S. interests. The U.S. sought to stabilize the 
Colombian political system, which, because of two Colombian government collapses in 
1948-1949, was on the verge of complete disintegration.201 The proximity of Colombia to 
the Panama Canal marked the Colombian crisis as a “vital concern to the United States,” 
according to the U.S. State Department.202 The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonel 
Edward Lansdale, argued for aggressive engagement on the part of the U.S. to protect its 
access to the canal: “During the expected two years remaining in the Presidency of  
Lleras Camarago, there is a real opportunity for the U.S. to undertake assistance to 
Colombia to correct the situation of political insurrection which reportedly has caused a 
200 Colombia Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility, Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on 
Latin America, 1989. 39. 
201 Stephen J. Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence. Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1992. 196. 
202 Ibid., 198. 
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 quarter-million deaths and displaced over a million and a half people since 1948 in this 
area neighboring a place so vital to our own national security as the Canal Zone.”203 
The U.S. also maintained significant economic interests in Colombia. In 1959, 
Colombia was among the largest markets in South America for U.S. direct foreign 
investment (FDI). Of the $339 million of U.S. FDI in Colombia, $225 million was in oil, 
followed by manufacturing, public utilities, and general trade.204 This enhanced the 
economic importance of Colombia to the U.S., as access to oil is not merely 
manufactured good that can be easily replaced. 
 The civil war lasted nearly a decade and pitted Conservative and Liberal peasants 
against one another, with the death toll of the war estimated to be upwards of 200,000. 
Peace was secured in 1958, through the formation of a National Front rotational 
government, under which the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to trade off the 
presidency every four years.205  
The majority of the armed groups, referred to pejoratively as bandoleros, 
surrendered to the Government and were thereby granted amnesty. One of the key 
leaders, Manuel Marulanda, began supporting the Communist Party after feeling 
alienated by both the Conservative and Liberal parties. Marulanda would later go on to 
form the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC), the military 
wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The FARC, bolstered by government 
sponsored dispossession peasant lands, would become the most armed and dangerous 
203 Stokes, America's Other War. 68. 
204 Randall, Colombia and the United States. 241. 
205 Stokes, America's Other War. 68. 
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 guerilla movement in South American history, representing the spread of communist 
sentiments into Latin America. 
U.S. Counter-Insurgency Policy  
 
 During the Cold War, the U.S. intervened in more states in Latin American than 
any other continent, utilizing counter-insurgency (CI) as the primary tactic of coercion.206 
U.S. strategists used CI, in accordance with President Eisenhower’s Domino theory, to 
internally police U.S.-backed dictatorships and silence left wing insurgencies to prevent 
Soviet expansionism.207 CI was formally recognized as a tool of U.S. statecraft when 
President Kennedy signed the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act into law, sending U.S. aid to 
developing states in order to increase bilateral military connections and encourage 
capitalist economic development.    
 Walt Rostow, one of President Kennedy’s National Security Advisors, is 
responsible for developing the modernization theory as the theoretical element of U.S.-
sponsored CI. The modernization theory posited that the developmental process of Third 
World societies occurred in stages that would eventually result in industrial capitalism. 
This evolution was most vulnerable to communist revolution as the economy began to 
“take off” through modernization. Rostow posited that internal security arrangements 
provided by the U.S. were a necessity in preventing any such revolutions during the take 
off period.208 David Bell, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(AID), concurred, arguing that a “general  theory of economic development,” required a 
206 Stokes, America's Other War. 67. 
207 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference." April 7, 1954. 
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 “minimum degree of personal security,” with the Cuban revolution bring to light the fact 
that “we must often make special adaptations to achieve this, [as] guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism [are] obstacles to the peaceful concentration on the problem of economic 
growth.”209 
 Kennedy’s Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 devoted the U.S. to improving “the 
ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, 
defeat [Communist] aggression.” The U.S. sought to achieve this via “arrangements for 
individual and collective security,” and by assisting “friendly countries to maintain 
internal security…essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political 
progress.”210 The U.S. CI doctrine was founded to fight a war on communist expansion 
on ideological, political, and military fronts. The internal security role of the recipient 
nation’s military was to police their populations, thereby preventing indigenous 
communist rebels from challenging the status quo.  
 As the past century and a half had been a time of constant turmoil and revolution, 
the internally focused Latin-American states committed fully to the U.S. CI strategy and 
formed the core of U.S. strategy in Latin America throughout the Cold War. U.S. support 
included security assistance, the legitimization of repressive regimes, and the training of 
Latin American military personnel at U.S. training academies. The U.S. Army established 
the School of the Americas (SOA), which ended up training over 40,000 members of 
various Latin American militaries by the end of the Cold War (the school has since been 
renamed the Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and 
209 Stokes, America's Other War. 58. 
210 US Congress, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Chapter 22, Title 32, Section 501. 
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 continues to train Latin American military members to this day).211 In 1947, Secretary of 
War Robert P. Patterson explained the reasoning behind setting up these academies and 
what benefits would flow from them: 
[T]he provision of United States Equipment is the keystone since United States 
methods of training and organization must inevitably follow its adoption along 
with far-reaching concomitant benefits of permanent United States military 
missions and the continued flow of Latin American officers through our service 
schools. Thus will our ideals and way of life be nurtured in Latin America, to the 
eventual exclusion of totalitarian and other foreign ideologies?212 
 The U.S. policy planning process recognized strong, authoritarian states as the 
best supporter of U.S. interests in Latin America. These authoritarian states often became 
despotic, carrying out massive violations of human rights, putting the U.S. at odds with 
its publicly declared objective of preventing human rights abuses. The U.S. was not just 
guilty of supporting the states that committed these violations by association, practices 
had been developed and passed on from U.S. CI doctrine. The U.S.-sponsored CI 
doctrine advocated for not only the confronting of armed insurgencies, but also the 
policing and disciplining of unarmed civilians. Though the Colombian government was 
repressive prior to the U.S. CI aid, the intervention further strengthened and legitimized 
the strategy of state terrorism in the name of anti-communism. 
211 Stokes, America's Other War. 58. 
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 CI Strategy in Practice 
 
 U.S. Special Forces took the leading role in training indigenous military and 
paramilitary forces in CI tactics. “The Special Action Force [U.S. Special Forces]… 
provides advisory personnel and mobile training teams to advise, train and provide 
operational assistance for paramilitary forces.”213 A 1962 special warfare field manual 
described the training program for the U.S.’s allied forces; training encompassed, 
“guerrilla warfare, propaganda, subversion, intelligence and counter-intelligence, terrorist 
activities, civic action, and conventional combat operations.”214 Counter-Insurgency 
Operations, a Special Forces manual that was used to teach foreign militaries on how to 
fight asymmetrical warfare against insurgents, stressed the “maintenance of the initiative 
by prompt offensive actions, economy of force and employment of suitably organized 
and trained troops and police in all-weather field operations utilizing guerrilla/terrorist 
tactics.” The manual broke down CI warfare into eight distinct categories; “a) Meeting 
engagements; b) Attacks; c) Defense; d) Ambushes… ; e) Raids; f ) Pursuit actions; g) 
Interception actions; h) Terror Operations.”215  
Psychological warfare against the recipient’s population was not just tolerated, the 
U.S. Army had a manual for it, stating that psychological operations were a central 
component in the CI arsenal. The Psychological Operations manual specifically stated, 
“although most past experiences of the military in the conduct of propaganda campaigns 
has been limited to periods of general war or limited war, the realities of the Cold War 
213 US Army Counterinsurgency Force, FM31-22. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1963. 85. 
214 Concepts for US Army Counterinsurgency Activities, Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 
1962. 
215 Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-
terrorism, 1940-1990. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992. 105-7. 
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 indicate that military psychological operations has a major and essential mission to fulfill 
in activities not involving full-scale hostilities.” The manual explicitly declared that the 
primary target “for tactical psychological operations is the local civilian population.” If 
all other methods failed, the manual advocated the targeting of civilians to instill terror:  
Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or 
collaborating with an enemy occupation force. Themes and appeals disseminated 
to this group will vary accordingly, but the psychological objectives will be the 
same as those for the enemy military. An isolation program designed to instill 
doubt and fear may be carried out … If these programs fail, it may become 
necessary to take more aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even 
abductions. The abduction and harsh treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken 
the collaborators’ belief in the strength and power of their military forces.216 
 Another military manual on handling sources also advocated the harsh treatment 
of civilians. Handling Sources was used by U.S. Special Forces to teach recipient nations 
how to cultivate government informants from within insurgent operations. The manual 
encouraged techniques to gain formation such as the targeting of family members, threats 
and use of physical violence. The CI operation should “cause the arrest of the 
“employee’s parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the 
placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization.”217 
 The use of torture and intimidation was the cornerstone of U.S. CI operations. 
Recipient militaries received expert training via U.S. Special Forces in the use of 
216 Psychological Operations, FM33-5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1962. 122, 125, 
115-16. 
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 terrorism, and “abduction and harsh treatment” in order to make civilian dissent 
extremely unsavory. This policy of terror was used so widely throughout Latin America 
that it was generically termed “disappearances” by the victims’ families and human rights 
group that began to monitor such activists.218 The Colombian government would make 
wide use of the U.S. CI methods and training to put down regime threatening guerilla 
movements during the second half of the twentieth century.  
The Colombian Peace Process 
 
 Though Colombia enjoyed a stable economy from the 1960s to the 1980s, the 
majority of the Colombian populace did not see any economic growth. In 1986, 
Colombia’s National Administrative Bureau of Statistics showed that 40 percent of 
Colombians lived in poverty and 18 percent in absolute poverty (unable to meet basic 
nutrional needs).219 The level of poverty was further highlighted by the fact that the “top 
three percent of Colombia’s landed elite own[ed] 71.3 percent of arable land, while fifty-
seven percent of the poorest farmers subsist[ed] on 2.8 percent.”220 The poverty was most 
severe in rural areas, contributing to the mass urban migration that took place during this 
time. In 1951, 61 percent of Colombians resided in rural areas, by 1983, that number had 
fallen to only 26 percent.221 
 This mass migration resulted in extensive shantytowns on the outskirts of 
Colombia’s urban cities. The squalid conditions precipitated the rise of the urban lower-
218 "Fighting Against Forced Disappearances in Latin America," FEDEFAM. 
219 Colombia Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility, Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on 
Latin America, 1989. 8-9. 
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 class, leading to increased protests, strikes, and support for the FARC. The continued 
growth of the guerrilla movements, internationally visible signs of poverty in Colombia’s 
urban centers, and the failure of the Colombian military to destroy the guerillas, forced 
President Betancur to begin peace proceedings in 1982. The peace process was the first 
of its kind in Colombia, and started with complete amnesty for guerilla fighters, which 
was incentivized via financial credits, land, and housing to re-enter the civilian sector.222 
President Betancur the created the Peace Commission, which would advise him on the 
peace process, and meet and negotiate with the representatives of the guerilla movements. 
In response, a number of Colombia’s guerrilla groups agreed to a ceasefire in 1984.  
 The entire peace process sought to turn Colombia’s traditionally bipartisan 
political system into more reform inclined parties. The FARC “was particularly interested 
in the government’s promotion of reforms that would facilitate meaningful participation 
in Colombia’s political life.”223 The FARC established the Patriotic Union (UP) to 
represent the left in Colombian politics and represent the peasant and working class 
Colombians. The UP called for reform to end the supremacy of the Conservative and 
Liberal parties in Colombian politics. The UP advocated for the popular election of local 
officials, rural land reform, and the nationalization of foreign business, Colombian banks 
and transportation.”224 
 In spite of the seemingly successful peace proceedings, the Colombian military 
and paramilitaries, supported and trained by the U.S., increased their CI offensive against 
the guerrilla groups and civilians. Human Rights Watch noted that the majority of the 
222 Stokes, America's Other War. 74. 
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 Colombian military’s “security measures” were designed to control the “local residents” 
in militarized areas. The Colombian military continued attacking guerrillas and even 
assassinated former fighters who had received amnesty.225 Americas Watch described the 
situation during the first year of the peace talks, “Large parts of the country are 
exclusively governed by the armed forces. To all intents and purposes, the armed forces 
are the only government, their rule is harsh. It is marked by torture and massacres.”226  
 Throughout the peace process, the U.S. continued to support the Colombian 
military crackdown. The State Department’s annual human rights reports made no 
mention of the extensive human rights abuses committed by Colombian military 
personnel. The U.S. military continued to train the Colombian military and sent over $50 
million worth of arms in the first year of the official “ceasefire.”227 Continued U.S. CI 
military aid and training thus legitimized the Colombian military actions and undermined 
the peace proceedings.  
The War on Drugs 
 
 When the Cold War came to a close, the U.S. substituted the “war on 
communism” with the “war on drugs” as the justification for continued U.S. military aid 
to South America. In a counter-drug strategy paper the State Department argued that the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in South America needed to “draw more 
equipment and doctrine from the military as the task at hand ceases to be the traditional 
law enforcement for which the agency was created.” Adding that the U.S. objective 
225 Ibid., 55. 
226 Human Rights in the Two Colombias: Functioning Democracy, Militarized Society, New York, NY: 
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 “should be a steady withdrawal of DEA” from the counter-drug role “as military and 
economic assistance allows local [military] forces to take up these tasks.”228 President 
George Bush Sr. explained the logic of the expansion of anti-narcotic operations: the 
“cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source” by destroying the 
“crops wherever they are grown,” and the “labs wherever they exist.”229 
 In September 1989, President Bush announced the Andean initiative, a five-year 
plan that would send $2.2 billion in aid to Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. This initiative 
would make these three states the leading recipients of U.S. military aid in the western 
hemisphere.230 One of the main conditions that Colombia would have to accept before 
receiving aid was the restructuring of their economy to further allow the influx of U.S. 
capital. In 1990, in return for accepting the conditions Colombia received $65 million in 
military aid and 100 U.S. military advisors (Special Forces), to aid Colombian security 
forces in the new counter-narcotics operations.231 
 The Andean Initiative expanded the role of the Colombian military, the U.S. 
Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency directly into counter-
narcotics mission. Unfortunately, the counter-narcotics initiatives often combined the 
insurgency movements that had been brewing in Colombia for decades with the drug-
traffickers. National Security Directive 18, which outlined the White House’s counter-
narcotics strategy, described the Andean Initiative as involving “expanded assistance to 
indigenous police, military, and intelligence officials” which would be used to allow 
228 Stokes, America's Other War. 82. 
229 Ibid., 82. 
230 "Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.–Colombia Policy, 1988–2002," National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book, 69 (2002). 
231 Ibid., Vol I. 
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 “them to regain control of their countries from an insidious combination of insurgents 
and drug traffickers” with increased “military assistance to neutralize guerrilla support 
for trafficking.”232 From the very inception of the Andean Initiative, insurgents and drug 
traffickers were intrinsically linked. This delineates an important shift in the justifications 
for U.S. policy in Latin America; U.S. national security interests shifted from the 
containment of insurgents linked to the spread of communism, to the containment of 
insurgents linked to international drug traffickers. The longstanding military aid and 
training itself was marginally repurposed, but the public rationale was completely 
different, making it a fresh issue in the eyes of the American people.  
Post 9/11 Policy 
 
When President George W. Bush was elected in 2001, his administration wanted 
to lower the military aid that had been flowing to Colombia for decades by 24 percent. 
This decrease was accompanied by nearly exact increases in the countries that surrounded 
Colombia.233 This new aid package, the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), was justified 
as part of the U.S.’s ongoing war on drugs. The U.S. State Department, in their 
rationalization for the appropriations of the 2002 budget, stated that the goal of U.S. aid 
in Colombia was to “help the Government of Colombia to eliminate all illicit cultivation 
and the infrastructure which supports production of illicit drugs.”234 The 2002 ARI 
distributed $367 million in military aid and $147 million in social and economic aid to 
Colombia. The military aid was used to maintain and repair military equipment that was 
232 National Security Directive 18: International Narcotics Strategy, 1989. 
233  Stokes, America's Other War. 105. 
234 “International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2002 Budget Justification,” Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, (2001). 26. 
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 provided to Columba and continue military training programs. Of the total aid package 
that was sent to Colombia, 75 percent was going directly to Colombia’s military and 
police.235 Though supporters of the 2002 ARI pointed out that the initiative lowered the 
number of U.S. military advisors in Colombia from 500 to 400, it placed no limits on 
how those military advisors trained and employed local forces, nor the number of active 
nationals.  
During the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. foreign policy pivoted to exhibit a 
strong counter-terrorist orientation. The primary shift towards a war on terror in 
Colombia has maintained the substantial funding for the Colombian military, but has 
altered its context to the language counter-terrorism from that of counter-narcotics. 
Statements by US Senator John McCain, future  Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, in 2002 revealed thought process behind this shift: “American policy 
has dispensed with the illusion that the Colombian government is fighting two separate 
wars, one against drug trafficking and another against domestic terrorists.” Senator 
McCain explained that the U.S. has abandoned “any fictional distinctions between 
counter-narcotic and counter-insurgency operations.”236 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the U.S. dropped the pretense that the military 
assistance that it provided to Colombia as being driven solely for counter-narcotics, and 
began to justify its funding as a strategy of counter-terrorism directed at the FARC, who 
were reportedly linked to international terrorism in addition drug trafficking. U.S. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled the FARC as the “most dangerous international 
235 Adam Isacson, "Why We Oppose the Andean Regional Initiative." Center for International Policy. 
September 24, 2001. 
236 Stokes, America's Other War. 106. 
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 terrorist group based in the Western Hemisphere.”237 The U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, ironically declared that the “40 
million people of Colombia deserved freedom from terror and an opportunity to 
participate fully in the new democratic community of American States.”238 Even 
Secretary of State Colin Powell drew comparisons between the FARC and Al-Qaeda to 
justify aid, stating that there was little “difficulty in identifying [Bin Laden] as a terrorist, 
and getting everybody to rally against him. Now, there are other organizations that 
probably meet a similar standard. The FARC in Colombia comes to mind.”239 Secretary 
Powell’s Assistant Secretary, Rand Beers, declared in a sworn statement that it was the 
positon of the State department that it “believed the FARC Terrorists have received 
training in Al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan.” Assistant Secretary Beers was later 
forced to admit that this statement was in fact a lie.240 However, the point had already 
been seared into the minds of the American people: the U.S. military aid that was sent to 
Colombia supported pro-U.S. democracy and suppressed “terrorists.” Nowhere is it 
mentioned how actual U.S. strategy and doctrine worked, the U.S. backed CI, which 
could have itself been classified as state terrorism. 
With the new counter-terrorist orientation the Bush Administration approved the 
emergency Supplemental Appropriations request to review be reviewed by Congress. The 
$28 billion global counter-terrorism bill contained numerous provisions that military aid 
provided to Colombia should not only be used to wage a war on drugs, but to also fight 
“terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 
237 John Ashcroft, DEA/Drug Enforcement Rollout. U.S. Department of Justice, March 19, 2002. 
238 Otto J. Reich, "The Crucial Battle For Colombia." July 19, 2002. 
239 Stokes, America's Other War. 113. 
240 Ibid., 106. 
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 the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC).”241 This counter terrorist pivot continued in 2003 when the Bush administration’s 
aid packaged appropriated nearly $538 million for Colombian military funding. Most 
importantly though, is the fact that the 2003 ARI package softened the language used to 
monitor how the Colombian military collaborated with paramilitary forces. Previous 
policy had specified that the Colombian military must “vigorously prosecuting in the 
civilian courts,” whereas the ARI called for “effective measures to sever links” between 
the armed forces and paramilitaries. Further, the Colombian military was no longer 
required to “cooperate fully,” now merely some ambiguous level of “cooperation” was 
acceptable.242 The ARI increased the levels of U.S. funding to the Colombian military, 
while simultaneously decreased the protections that ensure Colombia complied with the 
basic safeguards of human rights.  
Ultimately, U.S. intervention in Colombia has attempted to stabilize the social, 
economic, and political arrangements of the country, in order to align with the best 
interest of the U.S. The Cold War provided a justification for the U.S. CI operations and 
training to solidify the stability of the Colombian government through whatever means 
necessary. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. continued its CI operations and 
military aid under the guise of the war on drugs. Finally, after the September 11 attacks, 
the U.S. has further incorporated the war on terror as one of its numerous justifications 
for continued aid.  
 
241 U.S. Congress, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Washington, D.C.; U.S. G.P.O, 2002. 22. 
242 Stokes, America's Other War. 107. 
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  Concluding Remarks 
 United States foreign policy, as with any nation’s foreign policy, has attempted to 
create social, economic, and political conditions in the world that would most favor the 
interests of the U.S. As the U.S. grew in power during the early 19th century, President 
Monroe outlined a doctrine that prohibited European interference in the affairs of the 
New World. Though, at the time, the U.S. retained neither the military nor the economic 
power to enforce the doctrine, it revealed the future designs of U.S. foreign policy. The 
U.S. viewed the Americas as off limits to Europeans, and wholly open to U.S. interests. 
This doctrine served as the basis for the later notion of Manifest Destiny, and would 
guide U.S. foreign policy in Latin America for well over a century.  
 Bolstered with the Monroe Doctrine and an increasingly well-funded navy, the 
U.S. looked to strike away the influence of the British from Central America. The 
discovery of gold in California had raised both the American civilian presence, and 
transisthmian interest in the Central American nations. This interest was economic in its 
foundation; Latin America was ripe for investment and European nations were viewed as 
unfairly reaping the benefits of investment. U.S. clashes with Great Britain in Central 
America where characterized by aggressive tactics, after the fact negotiations, and native 
non-participation. Through these methods of diplomacy, the U.S. began blocking out the 
Central American nations from European control, and secured their economic and 
strategic interests for itself.  
 After the confrontations with the British the U.S. was faced with conflict from 
within the Americas itself, Chile. After the War of the Pacific, Chile had positioned itself 
as the most powerful nation in South America, a possible challenger to the U.S.’s rising 
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 power. The U.S. turned a minor diplomatic hiccup, the Baltimore Affair, into an 
international crisis and threatened war against Chile. Chile, at the strong urging of the 
European powers, gave into U.S. demands, thereby cementing the U.S.’s status as the 
major power in the Americas.  
The U.S. then looked to its southern border, and saw Cuba, a nation troubled with 
internal and external uncertainties, as an economic opportunity ripe for the taking. The 
U.S. invested heavily in the island, essentially incorporating it into the U.S. economy in a 
way from which it could not be untangled without devastating effect. At a time of crisis 
between Cuba and Spain, the U.S. landed military forces on the island, severing the last 
major European connection in the Caribbean, and secured the island for its own economic 
and political interests. At this point, the U.S. political and economic hegemony was 
undisputed in the western hemisphere.  
 With the election of President Roosevelt in the 1930s, we see an important shift in 
U.S. foreign policy. Recognizing the growing discontent and hostility in Latin America, 
Roosevelt proclaimed that he would dedicate the nation to being a good neighbor, and 
respect the rights of Latin American nations. Henceforth the U.S. would need a 
sufficiently credible reason for intervention other than pure economic interest. Following 
World War II the U.S. began supplying military aid and questionable training techniques 
to stabilize the Latin American nations fighting against insurgencies. This aid was 
justified as preventing the spread of communism, a very real fear throughout the western 
world, though the U.S. undoubtedly reaped the economic benefit of stable, friendly 
administrations. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. once again needed a 
justification for continued aid to Latin America, and President Bush provided just that 
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 when he declared a war on drugs. Aid continued to flow the Latin American countries, as 
nations that had fought communist insurgents now rebranded the insurgencies as drug 
traffickers. 
From the view of the average American, the post 9/11 world looks radically 
different from the era of the cold war and its aftermath. Americans are constantly 
reminded that the U.S. is in a “war against terror” by the NSA, the TSA, increased 
security across the nation, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Latin American military and 
training aid that was once appropriated to fight the communist insurgencies, then the 
narco-insurgencies, is now used to fight insurgencies rebranded as terrorist organizations. 
The tactics and procedures have not been radically changed, nor has the aid packages 
themselves, which begs the questions what has really changed? While there have been 
credible threats made from the Middle East, the answer in terms of Latin America is 
nothing. For the cynical American interventionist, the 9/11 attacks were a dream come 
true: the constant and unseen threat of terror that frightens most Americans to their very 
core has written a blank check to the American government. Military aid justified under 
the cloak of counter-terrorism is rarely challenged, and has provided the pretext for 
American intervention in Latin America to secure U.S. economic and political interests 
for the foreseeable future. 
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